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This thesis deals with topics related to monetary policy in general. The dissertation
consists of three chapters. The rst chapter focuses on the role of monetary policy in
resource-rich developing countries from a theoretical perspective. The second chapter
empirically analyses the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in resource-
rich countries. The third chapter studies the monetary transmission channels in the Czech
Republic by using micro-level data.
In the rst chapter we construct a DSGE model for a small, open economy to show
that if scal indiscipline, in the form of immediate responses to foreign resource revenue
changes is inevitable, then monetary policy can help improve the allocation problem.
The simulation results indicate that targeting the exchange rate or price level, through
foreign exchange interventions by the central bank, can soften the negative eects of
Dutch Disease and stabilize the economy in the face of volatile natural resource revenues
in the short run. We also nd that a xed exchange rate regime outperforms price level
targeting by delivering higher isolation and hence less vulnerability to shocks in natural
resource revenues. In contrast, if the central bank chooses to pursue a laissez faire policy,
i.e., not to intervene, then the economy becomes vulnerable to shocks in foreign resource
revenues and the resource curse becomes more severe.
The second chapter studies the specic determinants of the choice of exchange rate
regime in resource-rich countries. We run multinomial logit regressions for an unbalanced
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panel data set of 145 countries over the 1975-2004 period. We nd that resource-rich coun-
tries are more likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime compared to resource-poor
countries. Furthermore, we provide evidence that output volatility contributes to the
likelihood of choosing a xed exchange rate regime, positively in resource-rich countries
and negatively in resource-poor countries. In resource-rich countries the uctuations in
natural resource extraction and exports are the main sources of output volatility. We
claim that in resource-rich countries a xed exchange rate regime is mainly preferred due
to its stabilization function in the face of turbulent foreign exchange inows. Moreover,
our results reveal that the role of democracy and independent central banks in choosing
more exible exchange rate regimes is stronger in resource-rich countries. In resource-
rich countries with non-democratic institutions and non-independent central banks, the
government is less accountable for spending natural resource revenues and scal domi-
nance prevails. In this situation, uctuations in natural resource revenues are more easily
transmitted into the domestic economy and therefore a xed exchange rate becomes the
more favorable option.
In the third chapter, coauthored with Dana Hájková and Ivana Kubicová, we use
rm-level nancial data for Czech rms in the period from 2003 to 2011 and test for the
role of companies' nancial structure in the transmission of monetary policy. Our results
indicate that higher short-term interest rates coincide with lower shares of total debt and
long-term debt, and with higher shares of short-term bank loans and trade credit. We
nd that rm-specic characteristics, such as size, age, collateral, and prot aect the
way monetary policy inuences the external nancing decisions of rms. These ndings
indicate the presence of informational frictions in credit markets and hence provide some
empirical evidence on the existence of a broad credit channel in the Czech Republic.
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Abstrakt
Tato práce se zabývá tématy v²eobecn¥ spojenými s m¥novou politikou. Disertace se
skládá ze t°í kapitol. První kapitola je zam¥°ena na roli m¥nové politiky v rozvojových
zemích bohatých na zdroje z teoretického hlediska. Druhá kapitola empiricky analyzuje
determinanty volby kurzového reºimu v zemích bohatých na zdroje. T°etí kapitola studuje
monetární transmisní kanály v eské republice s vyuºitím dat na mikroúrovni.
V první kapitole je vybudován DSGEmodel pro malou otev°enou ekonomiku ukazující,
ºe kdyº je skální nekáze¬ ve form¥ okamºitých reakcí na zm¥ny zahrani£ních p°íjm·
z p°írodních zdroj· nevyhnutelná, pak m¥nová politika m·ºe pomoci zlep²it aloka£ní
problém. Výsledky simulace ukazují, ºe cílování sm¥nného kurzu nebo cenové úrovn¥
prost°ednictvím devizových intervencí centrální banky m·ºe zmírnit negativní dopady
holandské nemoci a stabilizovat hospodá°ství tvá°í v tvá° nestálým p°íjm·m z p°írodních
zdroj· v krátkém období. Také zji²´ujeme, ºe reºim xního sm¥nného kurzu p°ekonává
cílování cenové hladiny tím, ºe poskytuje vy²²í izolaci a tím i men²í zranitelnost v·£i
²ok·m v p°íjmech z p°írodních zdroj·. Oproti tomu, kdyº se centrální banka rozhodne
provád¥t politiku laissez faire, tj. nezasahování, pak se ekonomika stává zraniteln¥j²í v·£i
²ok·m v p°íjmech ze zahrani£ních zdroj· a prokletí zdroj· se stává je²t¥ závaºn¥j²ím.
Druhá kapitola zkoumá specické p°í£iny volby kurzového reºimu v zemích bohatých
na zdroje. Vyuºíváme multinomické logitové regrese pro nevyváºená panelová data ze 145
zemí mezi lety 1975 a 2004. Zji²´ujeme, ºe zem¥ bohaté na zdroje s v¥t²í pravd¥podob-
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ností p°ijímají pevný kurzový reºim v porovnání se zem¥mi chudými na zdroje. Dále
p°iná²íme d·kazy, ºe volatilita výstup· p°ispívá pozitivn¥ k pravd¥podobnosti výb¥ru
reºimu pevného kurzu v zemích bohatých na zdroje a negativn¥ v zemích chudých na
zdroje. V zemích bohatých na zdroje jsou uktuace v t¥ºb¥ a exportu nerostných surovin
hlavním zdrojem nestálosti produkce. Tvrdíme, ºe v zemích bohatých na zdroje je xní
kurzový reºim preferovaný zejména kv·li své stabiliza£ní funkci v prost°edí turbulent-
ních devizových p°íjm·. Navíc na²e výsledky odhalují, ºe role demokracie a nezávislosti
centrální banky p°i výb¥ru pruºn¥j²ího kurzového reºimu je siln¥j²í v zemích bohatých
na zdroje. V zemích bohatých na zdroje s nedemokratickými institucemi a závislou
centrální bankou je vláda mén¥ zodpov¥dná p°i utrácení p°íjm· z p°írodních zdroj· a
p°evládá skální dominance. V této situaci jsou výkyvy v p°íjmech z p°írodních zdroj·
snadn¥ji p°eneseny do domácí ekonomiky, £ímº se pevný kurz stává výhodn¥j²í moºností.
Ve t°etí kapitole spolu se spoluautorkami Danou Hájkovou a Ivanou Kubicovou pou-
ºíváme nan£ní data na úrovni podnik· pro £eské rmy v období 2003-2011 a testujeme
roli nan£ní struktury spole£ností v transmisi m¥nové politiky. Na²e výsledky ukazují,
ºe vy²²í krátkodobé úrokové sazby se shodují s niº²ím podílem celkového a dlouhodobého
dluhu a s vy²²ími podíly krátkodobých bankovních úv¥r· a obchodních úv¥r·. Zji²´ujeme,
ºe remní charakteristiky, jako je velikost, stá°í, vý²e zastavitelného majetku a zisk,
ovliv¬ují zp·sob, jakým m¥nová politika ovliv¬uje rozhodnutí o externím nancování
rem. Tato zji²t¥ní nazna£ují existenci informa£ních frikcí na úv¥rových trzích, a tím
poskytují empirickou podporu pro existenci ²ir²ího úv¥rového kanálu v eské republice.
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Chapter 1
Monetary Policy in Resource-Rich Developing
Economies
Abstract
The economic literature acknowledges that to avoid the resource curse, resource-rich
countries should restrict scal expansion and save a signicant part of resource revenues
outside the domestic economy. However, in these countries governments tend to ineec-
tively spend a considerable part of windfall revenues in the short run. In this study we
construct a DSGE model for a small, open economy to show that if scal indiscipline, in
the form of immediate responses to foreign resource revenue changes is inevitable, then
monetary policy can help improve the allocation problem. The simulation results indicate
that targeting the exchange rate or price level, through foreign exchange interventions
by the central bank, can soften the negative eects of Dutch Disease and stabilize the
economy in the face of volatile natural resource revenues in the short run. We also nd
that a xed exchange rate regime outperforms price level targeting, by delivering higher
isolation and hence less vulnerability to shocks in natural resource revenues. In contrast,
if a central bank chooses to pursue a laissez faire policy, i.e., not to intervene, then the
economy becomes vulnerable to shocks in foreign resource revenues and the resource curse
becomes more severe.
An earlier version of this paper has been published in Aliyev, R., 2012, Monetary Policy in Resource-
Rich Developing Economies, CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, No. 466. This research was supported
by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a program of the Global Development Network.
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1.1 Introduction
A large stream of research nds evidence that sustainable economic development of
resource-rich countries is challenged by their ability to eciently absorb revenues from
resource exports. For instance, it has been documented that there is a negative relation-
ship between natural resource abundance and economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995,
2001; Auty, 1993, 2001a). In face of this challenge, the future development of a resource-
rich economy heavily depends on the successful formulation of policy with regards to the
revenues from natural resource exports. The key to this success is the restriction of scal
expansion and saving a signicant part of natural resource revenues abroad (Barnett and
Ossowski, 2003; Davis et al., 2003; Segura, 2006). However, the experience of resource-
rich developing countries shows that in these countries political pressure is often directed
toward spending the revenues from resource exports (Aliyev, 2012; Hermann, 2006). The
government's increased scal spending of these revenues creates appreciation pressure on
the domestic currency. This increases the imports of tradable goods, and decreases the
competitiveness of the domestic manufacturing sector. In the economic literature this
is called Dutch Disease, and is observed in most resource-rich economies (Corden and
Neary, 1982; Corden, 1984; Wijnbergen, 1984). In addition to Dutch Disease, such gov-
ernment policy often creates vulnerability to the volatility in the world prices of exported
commodities and the exhaustibility of natural resources in resource-rich countries.
Under these circumstances the question arises whether monetary policy plays a sig-
nicant role in the reallocation of natural resource revenues, and if so, which monetary
regimes deliver better outcomes? Natural resource exporting countries vary in their ex-
change rate arrangements from fully xed to independently oating monetary regimes,
and there are endless discussions over the appropriateness of these regimes. This paper
aims to contribute to this debate by evaluating three monetary regimes in a small, devel-
oping economy facing volatile and uncertain revenues from natural resource exports: (i)
xed exchange rate, (ii) price level targeting, and (iii) laissez-faire. The main nding is
that if scal indiscipline, in the form of immediate responses to foreign resource revenue
changes is inevitable, then certain monetary actions can help improve the allocation prob-
lem. In particular, targeting the exchange rate or price level through foreign exchange
interventions by the central bank allows for consumption smoothing and avoidance of the
negative eects of Dutch Disease. Also due to higher intensity in using foreign exchange
interventions, the xed exchange rate regime outperforms price level targeting by deliv-
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ering higher isolation and hence smaller vulnerability to shocks in foreign revenues. In
contrast, if the central bank chooses a laissez faire policy, more revenues are spent and
the domestic economy becomes more vulnerable to shocks in foreign revenues.
Figure 1.1: Normal form representation of the game between the scal and monetary
authorities
Such an interaction between scal and monetary policies can be described by a game
consisting of two players: scal and monetary authorities (Figure 1.1). In this game
the scal authority can choose between two possible policies: it can behave either in a
disciplined or in an undisciplined way. An undisciplined scal authority does not save
and spends windfall revenues in the short run. With disciplined behavior, which is the
opposite of undisciplined behavior, the scal authority does not respond immediately to
changes in natural resource revenues and keeps spending stable in the long run. The
monetary authority sets one of the three possible monetary regimes described above. In
this game the rst best solution is achieved when the scal authority behaves in a disci-
plined way regardless of the implemented monetary policy. We also seek to determine the
optimal monetary regime under the assumption that the scal authority always chooses
an undisciplined strategy, which is very common among developing countries. The inter-
esting nding is that the second and third best solutions are achieved when the monetary
authority chooses a xed exchange rate and a xed price level regime respectively, tak-
ing into account the advantages of these regimes in consumption smoothing. The worst
outcome is achieved with a laissez faire policy.
The assumption of a purely undisciplined scal authority is made to model a stylized
version of the situation observed in some oil exporting countries. We also hypothetically
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assume a government which never deviates its scal spending from the long run equi-
librium level. However, in real life, optimal spending lies somewhere in between these
two extremes. Here one can also think of a disciplined policy where the government
moderately increases spending during a period of high natural resource revenues and
moderately decreases it during a period of low or zero natural resource revenues (see
Barnett and Ossowski, 2003). However a sharp increase/cut in spending during high/low
natural resource revenues is commonplace among developing economies, which we treat
as undisciplined.
In this paper we construct a general equilibrium model reecting the main properties of
a resource-exporting, developing, small economy to evaluate the eectiveness of dierent
monetary regimes during shocks in revenues from natural resource exports. The model
replicates the main macroeconomic developments in Azerbaijan, a post-Soviet transition
economy which has been experiencing huge, volatile oil and gas revenues during the last
decade. In line with Dutch Disease threats, the limitedness of oil reserves and volatile
world oil prices make Azerbaijan vulnerable to revenues from oil exports. To mitigate
exchange rate appreciation, the Central Bank of Azerbaijan intervenes in the foreign
exchange market. The simulation of the model reveals that such a policy response is
eective in dealing with volatile and short-lived natural resource revenues. A similar
situation has been observed in a number of natural resource exporting emerging countries,
making the ndings of this research applicable also for these countries. Moreover, the
results from this paper can be applied to countries receiving aid, due to the similarities
between aid and natural resource revenue inows.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the
existing related literature on the topic. Section 3 describes the macroeconomic situation
and monetary policy in Azerbaijan to support the relevance of the model presented in
section 4. The simulation and ndings of the model are presented in section 5 and section
6 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
Resource-rich economies have been widely studied. The empirical literature on the one
hand nds a negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic
growth, and on the other hand tries to answer the question why resource-rich economies
tend to grow more slowly (Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Auty, 2001a; Gylfason et
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al., 1997; Cerny and Filer, 2007). The slower growth rate observed in natural resource
exporting countries, also known as the resource curse, is mainly explained through the
Dutch Disease concept. The Dutch Disease term was used for the rst time to describe
the decline of the tradable sector in the Netherlands driven by the discovery of large
natural gas elds in 1960s. In general the Dutch Disease denes an economic situation
in which all other traded sectors are crowded out by the one dominant tradable sector.
Furthermore, the increased exports of the dominant sector create appreciation pressure
on the domestic currency, which in turn harms the exports of other tradable goods.
The consolidated analysis of Dutch Disease was pioneered by Corden (1982, 1984,
1997). His archetypal economy includes three sectors: one non-tradable and two tradable.
In the benchmark case, a boom in one of the tradable sectors (termed as the booming
sector) leads to exchange rate appreciation and the contraction of the other tradable
sector (termed as the lagging sector). The resource-movement and the spending eects
are identied as two driving forces of Dutch Disease (Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 1986;
Corden, 1982; Acosta et al., 2009).
Corden (1982) examines dierent protective policies, such as trade protection through
taris and quotas, tax and subsidization and exchange rate protection. According to
him, exchange rate protection through devaluation, or preventing the appreciation of the
exchange rate, may seem attractive but this policy is not the rst best response because
it induces price increases and protects not only the lagging sector but also the booming
sector, which is unnecessary. Such a policy is disruptive if it leads to non-optimal saving
and accumulation of international reserves. Alternatively, a country can subsidize the
lagging sector by taxes collected from the booming sector, or apply taris or quantitative
restrictions on imports. However, tough international rules against tax-subsidization
and diculties in the legislation of taris make exchange rate protection more favorable.
Moreover, if a boom is due to the opening up of oil or gas reserves or a positive shock to
world oil prices, then exchange rate protection can help moderate the eects of the shock.
Corden claims that during investment and export booms a xed exchange rate regime
through foreign reserves accumulation and the sterilization of its monetary consequences
can prevent real appreciation and insulate an economy from Dutch Disease.
Lartey (2008) studies the role of monetary policy in a small open economy facing a
huge inow of capital due to a negative shock to the price of imported investment. He
nds that Dutch Disease in the form of a contracting manufacturing sector, rising prices
of nontradables and real exchange rate appreciation, occurs only under a xed exchange
11
rate regime and inactive monetary policy. However under a generalized Taylor rule where
the interest rate is used to mitigate the deviations of GDP, ination in nontradables, and
the exchange rate from the steady state, Dutch Disease never occurs. The paper mainly
focuses on eective investment and on the reduction in the price of exported investment,
which is dierent from the story of natural resource abundant developing countries.
Larsen (2004) points out a range of policy directives implemented by Norway, through
which Dutch Disease has successfully been avoided and revenues from oil extraction have
been used to accelerate economic growth. The most important lesson learned from Nor-
way is that investing a signicant part of revenues outside the economy and eliminating a
possible wage dierential between resource and other manufacturing sectors is the main
cure for the resource curse. Stevens (2003) claims that the resource curse can be turned
into a blessing only through prudent scal and monetary policies, with the dominant
role of the former policy. It is commonly accepted that the rst best solution is the
restriction of scal expansion and investing a signicant part of the oil revenues outside
the domestic economy, though there is no one rule for all cases, i.e., each country needs
a specic approach (Barnett and Ossowski, 2003; Davis et al., 2003; Segura, 2006).
The formulation of the optimal spending strategy becomes dicult because resource
abundance creates fertile ground for a rent seeking and predatory government (Auty,
2001b). Therefore, resource exporting economies tend to have poor spending strategies
(Hermann, 2006). Implicit proof of this is that in oil exporting countries the economic
cycle and scal spending move in the same direction as world oil prices (Husain et al.,
2008; Aliyev, 2012). The behavior of a resource-rich economy becomes tricky if the
government spends huge revenues from resource exports in the short run. In this case
monetary policy faces a dilemma in choosing between the stabilization of ination or
the exchange rate. If the central bank chooses to target ination, the exchange rate
becomes unsteady; conversely if it chooses to target the exchange rate, ination becomes
uncontrollable. Because in most oil exporting emerging countries monetary authorities
use the exchange rate as a nominal anchor (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Da Costa and
Olivo, 2008; Setser, 2007), the central bank faces diculties in controlling ination. To
maintain exchange rate stability the central bank increases the money supply, which leads
to an increase in foreign exchange reserves. Under such a combination of policies, the
central bank's behavior may seem tempting (Corden, 1982) as it protects the domestic
tradable sector through exchange rate protection and saves some part of natural resource
revenues as its foreign reserves.
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Uncertainty and easiness of foreign currency inows makes the stories of aid receiving
and natural resource abundant countries very similar. Therefore in studying natural
resource-rich countries, one can benet from the literature on countries experiencing a
huge inow of aid surges. Macroeconomic policies carry high importance in dealing with
the negative eects of huge and volatile foreign aid inows (Adam et al., 2009; Prati and
Tressel, 2006). For instance Prati and Tressel (2006) show that the adverse eects of
foreign aid, Dutch Disease and volatility can be mitigated through the accumulation or
spending of international reserves.
In the most relevant study Sosunov and Zamulin (2007) investigate an economy where
all tradable sectors are completely compressed by the oil and gas sector. Their main
nding is that the way the central bank of Russia responds to ination and the real
exchange rate through foreign exchange interventions is optimal. With such a policy
the central bank of Russia accumulates international reserves and plays the role of a
stabilization fund. There are some shortcomings in Sosunov and Zasulin's analysis that
can be improved. First, they do not consider a tradable sector other than the oil and gas
production sector, which is very important in countries facing Dutch Disease. Second, in
their study money is modeled on an ad hoc basis, i.e., money demand is simply determined
by a consumption-based quantity equation. Therefore in this cashless economy money
serves as a numeraire and there is no explicit justication for agents to hold money (for
a detailed discussion see Gali [2008] and Woodford [2003]).
Lama and Medina (2010) evaluate the role of nominal exchange rate stabilization in
a small open economy aected by Dutch Disease. They nd that preventing exchange
rate appreciation mitigates contraction of tradable output. Lama and Medina also show
that such a policy, through exchange rate interventions is highly distortionary as it leads
to the misallocation of resources and reduces welfare. In a very recent study Benkhodja
(2011) analyses monetary policy and the Dutch Disease in a DSGE framework. He nds
that a exible exchange rate regime improves the social welfare and helps to avoid the
Dutch Disease.
This review of the existing literature shows that there is no research that focuses
on the unique role of exchange rate pegging through foreign exchange interventions and
international reserve management in a natural resource abundant developing economy.
Given the underdeveloped nancial markets and poor spending experiences of developing
countries, such a policy may have exceptional benets in response to volatile and limited
windfall revenues. My research is intended to shed a light on this aspect of monetary
13
policy in a small, open economy in a DSGE framework.
1.3 Background: Azerbaijan
To support the main idea of the paper we consider the example of Azerbaijan, an oil and
gas rich, developing, small, open economy. This country possesses the macroeconomic
setting described in this research, though there are dozens of other countries with a similar
situation.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991,
which brought new challenges arising from broken economic relations and a fragile eco-
nomic and political system. The contract signed with western oil companies in 1994
started a new era of huge oil revenues.1 During the 2000s, economic growth has acceler-
ated, mainly driven by oil and gas production. The domestic economy is heavily aected
by massive windfall revenues, hence the share of oil in GDP (Figure 1.2) and in total
exports (around 95% during 2007-2011) is extremely high.
Figure 1.2: Structure of real GDP
The government dramatically increases its spending in response to increases in oil
and gas revenues (Figure 1.3). In the meantime, oil nanced scal expansion creates
appreciation pressure on the domestic currency. To prevent exchange rate appreciation
the Central Bank of Azerbaijan increases the money supply, which in turn raises its
international reserves (Figure 1.4). The recent world nancial crisis gives an interesting
insight into the mechanism of stabilization. The decline in oil and gas revenues was
1The earliest era started in the 19th century when Azerbaijan was on the frontier in the world's oil
industry and by the beginning of the 20th century more than half of the world's oil was produced here.
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accompanied by a fall in international reserves of the central bank and a constant money
supply. This means that during a low oil revenue period the Central of Azerbaijan was
using its international reserves as a buer. Because of this policy we observe a relatively
constant exchange rate and accelerated ination before the crisis, and low ination during
the crisis (Figure 1.5). We also observe a steady increase in aggregate consumption,
though this increase is smaller during the global nancial crisis (Figure 1.4).
Figure 1.3: Government expenditure
Figure 1.4: Selected macroeconomic variables
Given these numbers one can infer that in Figure 1.1, the case of Azerbaijan is sit-
uated at the intersection of undisciplined and xed exchange rate strategies, where
the government chooses to spend petrodollars and the central bank partially neutralizes
the impact of these dollars by foreign exchange interventions. During high oil revenues
the outcomes of this combination of policies are a xed exchange rate and accelerated
ination. If the Central Bank of Azerbaijan were to choose laissez faire or price level
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Figure 1.5: Ination and exchange rate
targeting, then the exchange rate would appreciate, harming the already fragile domestic
tradable sector and more oil revenues would be spent in the short run. Therefore the
current policy followed by the Central Bank of Azerbaijan is ecient in the sense that
besides exchange rate pegging it helps to achieve two important goals. First, such a policy
stabilizes the economy in face of volatile oil revenues by using international reserves as
a buer. Second, saving some part of oil revenues abroad implicitly softens the negative
eects of Dutch Disease. The results obtained from the theoretical model presented in
the next section support this idea.
These ndings in some sense coincide with the IMF's policy recommendations for
Azerbaijan. After 2003, the IMF withdrew its approval of the appropriateness of an
exchange rate anchor, which for a long period served to achieve macroeconomic stability,
and insisted on allowing nominal appreciation and maintaining lower ination later on.
However, in 2010 it clearly supported a U.S. dollar peg as an appropriate regime in the
short term and more exible in the medium term (IMF Country Reports).
1.4 The Model
We construct a dynamic general equilibrium model of a resource-rich, small, open, two
sector economy. The economy consists of four key agents: households, rms, scal and
monetary authorities. Besides the scal authority the monetary authority also has a
peculiar independence in saving some part of these revenues in the form of its international
reserves through foreign exchange interventions. The domestic economy produces two
types of consumption goods: non-tradables and tradable manufactured goods. There
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is an international market of tradable goods with unlimited demand and supply with
constant world prices. Economic agents cannot invest in interest-bearing assets. This
assumption is made to reect the situation observed in most underdeveloped natural
resource rich countries where a huge part of natural resource revenues is spent on non-
durable consumption goods and a small fraction is saved as cash holdings.
1.4.1 Households
The economy is populated by innitely many identical households of measure unity.
The representative household is endowed with one unit of time and transfer from the
government, τtFt, each period. Here τt is a share of natural resource revenues transferred
to households by the scal authority. Ft represents total natural resource endowment
meaning that uctuations in world prices of an exported natural resource or changes in
natural resource exports has a direct impact on it. The time endowment is split between
leisure and work. The representative household enters each period with a nominal money
balance from the previous period (Mt−1), and receives prot from the production sector
(Πt), interest on xed capital (K), and wages on supplied labor (L).
The household has preferences over consumption goods (Ct), leisure (1 − Lt), and
real money balances (Mt
Pt












) + ψLn(1− Lt)
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, (1.1)
subject to budget constraint









Here β is the discount factor, Ct is the aggregate consumption index consisting of
the consumption of manufactured goods CMt and non-tradable goods C
N





θθ(1−θ)1−θ , et is the nominal exchange rate in the units of domestic currency per
unit of foreign currency, Wt is the nominal wage, Rt is the nominal interest rate, PNt is
the price of domestic non-tradable goods and ζ, χ, ψ > 0. The price of foreign tradable
goods (PM
∗
t ) is given exogenously, hence we normalize it to one. Therefore the price of





t = et. Given the structure of the consumption aggregate, the consumption based
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price index is given by Pt = (PMt )
θ(PNt )
1−θ.1 The aggregate price index is dened as a
minimum expenditure price required to purchase one unit of composite real consumption.


























Equation (1.2) shows that the ratio of the value of the two types of consumption
goods is constant and depends on the shares of dierent consumption goods in aggregate
consumption. With equal shares the value of the consumption of manufactured and









This equation relates the current value of consumption to the expected future growth
rate of the money supply. Equation (1.4) expresses the relationship between the house-
hold's choice over consumption and leisure. Precisely, it relates the ratio between the
nominal value of aggregate consumption and leisure to the ratio of the coecient of
consumption and leisure in the household's utility function.
1.4.2 Firms
There are two production sectors in the domestic economy, tradable and nontradable,
and a continuum of identical rms in each sector. We assume Cobb-Douglas technology
in both sectors with dierent capital/labor intensities and total factor productivities.
The factors of production are mobile between the sectors, hence wages and interest rates
are equal in both sectors. We x aggregate capital at a constant level K. Therefore
K = KMt + K
N
t . A representative rm solves the prot maximization problem in the
tradable sector,
1For the derivation see Appendix 1.A.1.




























where α and γ are capital shares, and A and B are total factor productivities in the
tradable and non-tradable sectors, respectively. From the rst order conditions of these













This equation means that if capital intensity in the tradable sector is higher than
capital intensity in the non-tradable sector, then any change in the price ratio leads to a
proportional change in the capital/labor ratio.
1.4.3 Fiscal Authority
Each period the scal authority receives natural resource revenues and decides what
share of these revenues to transfer to households. For the sake of simplicity we assume
that the scal authority faces two possible choices:(i) it is either disciplined (τt 6= 1);
or (ii) it behaves in an undisciplined way (τt = 1). Under scal discipline, the scal
authority chooses values for τt such that households' endowment does not deviate from
the long run average value of natural resource revenues. This implies that there is no
eect of temporary changes in natural resource revenues on the domestic economy, or in
other words permanent income level is maintained. In contrast under undisciplined scal
policy any shock to the natural resource is reected in the household's natural resource
endowment. We assume that the scal authority saves natural resource revenues outside
the domestic economy, without interest accumulation in a special welfare fund. The
accumulation of the resources in this fund is given by:
Φt = Φt−1 + (1− τt)Ft.
As discussed above, disciplined scal policy does not necessarily imply zero transfers
to households and accumulation of all revenue from natural resource exports. Therefore
in the model, instead of τt = 0, (i.e., government saves all the revenue), we assume τt 6= 1,
3See Appendix 1.A.3 for the derivations.
19
which implies that the disciplined scal authority constantly changes its control variable
in order to maintain transfers at the permanent level.
1.4.4 Monetary Authority
The central bank chooses between one of three monetary regimes: (i) exchange rate
targeting, (ii) price level targeting, and (iii) laissez faire, where the central bank xes the
money supply. The assumption of the three pure regimes may seem unrealistic, however,
pegging the exchange rate and ination targeting are two alternative policies usually
considered by central bankers. Here we also consider a laissez faire policy or xed money
supply to capture the benchmark case where the central bank is inactive. Depending on
the implemented policy rule, one of the variables, et, Pt, or Mt is xed.
The central bank uses foreign exchange interventions to control the money supply. It
can sell/buy domestic currency (Mt), and buy/sell some share (µt) of foreign exchange
inows (Ft) in the foreign exchange market. This policy determines the path of interna-
tional reserves (St) denominated in the foreign currency and held outside the domestic
economy:
St = St−1 + µtFt.
An increase in the money supply is given by the following equation:
∆Mt = etµtFt.
The foreign exchange interventions enable the monetary authority to play a crucial role
in the allocation of resources in the economy. By increasing/decreasing the money supply,
the central bank uses ination tax and controls how much natural resource revenues are
spent and how much are saved as international reserves.
Here we do not make any assumption about the interest income on accumulated
reserves, neither of the scal authority, nor of the central bank. In the long run the
equilibrium value of foreign reserves, and consequently interest accumulation, is zero.
Introducing interest income does not have any qualitative impact in the long run, though
one can use interest for estimating the optimal spending/saving strategy in the short run,
to get more precise quantitative results. Given heterogeneous reserve accumulation under
dierent regimes, extra investment income would strengthen the position of a regime with
higher accumulation from the welfare perspective.
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1.4.5 Equilibrium
Now the characterization of the environment is completed, so we can dene the equi-
librium. Given the sequence of natural resource revenues {Ft}∞t=0 there is an equilib-
rium where the sequence of household's choice of {CMt }∞t=0, {CNt }∞t=0, {Mt}∞t=0, {Lt}∞t=0,
the rm's choice of {KMt }∞t=0, {KNt }∞t=0, {LMt }∞t=0, {LNt }∞t=0, the scal authority's choice of
{τt}∞t=0, the central bank's control variable {µt}∞t=0, prices {PMt }∞t=0, {PNt }∞t=0, exchange
rate {et}∞t=0, interest rate {Rt}∞t=0, and wage rate {Wt}∞t=0 such that
(i) the household's utility maximization problem (1.1) is solved,
(ii) the rms' prot maximization problems (1.5) and (1.6) are solved,
(iii) the market clearing holds
• in the labor market: (Lt)s = (LMt )d + (LNt )d
• in the capital market: K = (KMt )d + (KNt )d
• in the tradable goods market: CMt = Y Mt + (τt − µt)Ft
• in the non-tradable goods market: CNt = Y Nt
• in the money market: Mt −Mt−1 = etµtFt.
The market clearing condition in the tradable goods market means that households'
demand for tradable goods can be either met by the domestic production of tradables
or by import in exchange for foreign revenues from resource exports. Here µt may result
in negative values, meaning that spending on imported goods exceeds foreign revenues.
This happens through a decrease in the money supply and correspondingly the depletion
of international reserves.
1.5 Calibration
To solve the model numerically we x the model parameters consistent with the values
used in the economic literature. We assume that households assign a lower share (0.4) to
manufactured goods in their utility function. The capital share in the manufactured goods
production sector is higher than the capital share in the non-tradable goods production
sector. This assumption comes from the fact that the non-tradable sector mainly consists
of a labor intensive service sector opposed to the more capital intensive tradable sector,
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which mainly produces manufactured goods. Assuming a considerable low capital share
in the non-tradable sector has only a quantitative impact and enables visualization of the
dierences between monetary regimes. In the initial steady state we normalize the total
production (non-resource output denominated in foreign currency Y ), prices (P , PM , and
PN), exchange rate (e) and money supply (M) to unity. This normalization enables the
tracking of the changes in model variables as a percentage deviation from the base value.
The value of xed capital stock is taken from Koeda and Kramarenkos' (2008) estimate
for Azerbaijan. We assume that the household spends 3/5 of its time on work and 2/5 on
leisure. The list of all the simulation parameters used in the simulations is given in Table
1.1. After the simulations we additionally test the robustness of the results to changes in
parameters.
Table 1.1: Parameters used in calibration
1.5.1 Simulation Results
In this section we describe the simulation of the model and the results computed from
this simulation. The structural form of the model is shown in Appendix 1.A.4. We use
the MATLAB software package and the Dynare toolbox in all computations.
First we consider the eects of a permanent positive shock on the revenues from
natural resource exports. Then we analyze the case where natural resource revenues
are assumed to be stochastic. Stochasticity of natural resource revenues can be due to
volatility in the world prices of the exported natural resource or the uncertainty of existing
resources or future production capacity. The deterministic case with a permanent positive
shock is studied because of two reasons. First, it enables us to illustrate the eects of
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Dutch Disease in detail. Secondly, it explains the intuition behind the ndings from the
case where natural resource revenues are stochastic.
In all cases under the disciplined scal policy natural resource revenues have no impact
because of full isolation of the economy from the shocks. Hence scal discipline equates the
situation with volatile natural resource revenues to one where natural resource revenues
do not uctuate. Naturally in this framework monetary policy does not play any role.
Therefore we consider only the case with an undisciplined scal policy and compare the
results under dierent monetary regimes with a benchmark case where the scal authority
is disciplined.
Consequences of a permanent positive shock on natural resource revenues
For now let's assume that revenues from natural resource exports jump up permanently.
Perhaps an increase in foreign revenues that lasts forever is not a realistic assumption,
but such a formulation enables us to observe the eects of Dutch Disease and the role of
monetary policy in the reallocation process during the transition period to a new steady
state. We assume that in the beginning there is no revenue from natural resource exports
and the economy is in a steady state. Suddenly in period t=5 foreign resource revenues
jump to a level where the domestic economy produces almost only tradable goods and
the tradable sector is squeezed out. This assumption is made to reect a situation where
the economy suddenly experiences a huge inow of windfall revenues due to the discovery
of natural resource elds.
The rst nding from this analysis is the symptoms of Dutch Disease observed under
all monetary regimes. Hence, in general the steady-state values of the real macroeconomic
variables do not dier under various monetary regimes except foreign international re-
serves (Table 1.2). By comparing prior and posterior steady state levels, we can draw
several conclusions about the eects of Dutch Disease. The natural resource sector does
not use labor and capital in the model, and consequently the resource movement eect is
ruled out. Therefore, the wealth eect is the only driving force of the changes.4 Increased
income due to a permanent positive shock on foreign revenues increases aggregate demand
and price level, which implies real appreciation. The excess demand for the tradables and
non tradables is satised through imports and domestic production, respectively. There-
fore factors of production move from the tradable sector towards the nontradable sector.
4See Corden (1982) for a detailed analysis of wealth and resource movement eects in a three sector
economy.
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Table 1.2: Prior and posterior steady-state results
The nominal wage rate rises and the nominal interest rate declines. Hence Dutch Disease
is observed in the form of real appreciation, contraction of the domestic tradable sec-
tor's production and an increase of nontradable sector output no matter which monetary
regime is implemented.
These predictions of the model coincide with the movements in the actual data for
Azerbaijan and therefore proves the empirical validity of the proposed model. For in-
stance, as can be seen in Figures 1.2-1.5, an increase in natural resource revenues is ac-
companied by a sharp increase in government spending (undisciplined scal policy) and
aggregate consumption (the wealth eect). Observed growth in international reserves
of the central bank and money supply and relatively constant nominal exchange rate
and elevated ination during the oil boom indicates that the Central Bank of Azerbaijan
adopted a xed exchange rate regime and actively used foreign exchange interventions to
achieve its goal. Based on this inspection we can conclude that calibration of the model
produces transition paths comparable to those observed in the data.
The second interesting observation is heterogeneous accumulation of international
reserves and the growth in the money supply across dierent monetary regimes during
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Figure 1.6: Transition to the new steady state
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the transition to a new steady-state (Figure 1.6). As we see under a xed exchange
rate and price level targeting regimes, there is an accumulation of international reserves
contrary to the laissez-faire policy, where accumulation does not occur. We also observe
higher accumulation of international reserves under exchange rate targeting compared
to price level targeting. These dierences are due to the fact that the highest intensity
of foreign exchange interventions happens under a xed exchange rate regime. Under
price level targeting, such actions are less intensive and under laissez faire there is no
intervention. Because of these dierences in the accumulation of international reserves
the consumption of tradables is highest under laissez faire, medium under price level
targeting and smallest under a xed exchange regime. Therefore a xed exchange rate
regime brings about lower exchange rate appreciation and higher production of tradable
goods during the transition period. To generalize all these observations, we can conclude
that during high natural resource revenues a xed exchange rate regime outperforms
other regimes by saving some part of windfall revenues for future generations and by
weakening the symptoms of Dutch Disease in the short run. My further analysis with
stochastic natural resource revenues is mainly based on these ndings.
Stochastic revenues from natural resource exports
Now we can turn to a more realistic assumption where foreign revenue from natural
resource exports is stochastic. Following the literature we assume that revenue from
natural resource exports is determined by an AR(1) process dened as
Ft+1 = ρFt + (1− ρ)F + εt.
Here 0 < ρ < 1 and ε ∼ N(0, σ). The long run average of foreign resource revenues
(F ) is taken such that the economy produces mostly non-tradable goods and imports the
main part of tradable goods from abroad. This assumption reects the macroeconomic
situation in developing economies heavily aected by the abundance of natural resources.
The results from the simulation of the model under dierent monetary regimes are
summarized in Table 1.3. As we see, a xed exchange rate regime outperforms other
regimes by delivering the smallest volatility in aggregate consumption and leisure. We
observe higher volatility of money under a xed exchange rate regime compared to other
regimes. This happens because in order to x the exchange rate, the central bank uses
foreign exchange interventions more intensively to absorb the eects of shocks on foreign
revenues. In particular, during high natural resource revenues the central bank increases
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Table 1.3: Simulation results
the money supply and accumulates its international reserves, and during low or zero
foreign revenues it decreases the money supply by foreign exchange purchases that de-
crease its international reserves. A laissez-fare regime loses to other regimes by yielding
considerably higher volatility in consumption, as there is no use of foreign exchange in-
terventions and international reserves. All these dierences in volatilities can be visually
seen in Figure 1.7.
Dierent volatilities under dierent monetary regimes can be compared through the
welfare cost of the business cycle. We use Lucas' (1987) approach to estimate the welfare






















where η is the cost of uctuations. The welfare cost of the business cycle denotes
the percentage of increase in consumption needed each period to make the representative
household indierent between volatility and stability. The estimated values of η (Table
1.3)5 show that the representative household living in the economy with a xed exchange
rate, price level targeting, and laissez faire will require a 0.011, 0.013, and a 0.016 increase
in consumption, respectively, to be indierent between a current regime economy and an
5For the derivation of the η, see Appendix 1.A.5.
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Figure 1.7: Fluctuations in some variables under dierent monetary regimes
economy with no volatility, i.e., an economy with disciplined scal authority. These
numbers tell us that if scal indiscipline is inevitable, then it is less costly to live in an
economy with a xed exchange rate regime compared to other monetary regimes.






, 1−Lt)]), the rst best outcome
is achieved when the scal authority is disciplined. If the scal authority is undisciplined,
then a xed exchange rate regime holds its second best position by delivering the highest
total welfare (Table 1.3).
Alternatively, we can evaluate the role of monetary policy by specifying the preferences
of the central bank. Following the standard specication we assume that the central






[λ(Yt − Yn)2 + (πt − π∗)2] .
Here Yt is the total output at period t denominated in foreign currency, Yn is its
natural rate, πt is the ination rate at period t, π∗ is the long run ination target, and
λ is the weight that the central bank assigns on output deviations relative to ination
stabilization. We assume that the central bank desires to stabilize output around Yn, and
ination around zero (π∗ = 0).
A minimum value of the expected aggregate loss (E0[
∞∑
t=0
βtVt]) is achieved when scal
authority is disciplined regardless of the implemented monetary regime (Table 1.3). Under
undisciplined scal policy the parameter λ plays a key role. Zero weight on output gap
stabilization (λ = 0) implies strict ination targeting (Svensson 1997), and the xed price
level obviously wins over all other regimes by delivering the same outcome as disciplined
scal policy. If the central bank assigns equal shares to the output gap and ination
stabilization (λ = 1), then xed exchange rate and xed price level regimes bring about
the same loss while a laissez-faire regime still falls behind. With higher weight on output
gap stabilization (λ = 2), a xed exchange rate regime outperforms other regimes. The
varying outcomes under the dierent central bank's preferences are the result of the
diversity in natures: a xed price level regime implicitly targets ination, while a xed
exchange rate regime stabilizes the real sector as well, and a laissez faire regime has no
stabilization power.
All these comparisons provide the rationale as to why and how a xed exchange rate
regime may be an eective tool in the allocation of huge and volatile natural resource
revenues in developing economies.
1.5.2 Robustness Tests
In this section we test the robustness of the previous results to changes in the parameters
used in calibration. In the basic specication to normalize the variables of interest, we
assigned peculiar but not very dierent from conventional values for the parameters in
the utility block. A priori we can identify that all the parameters aect only the steady-
state levels of consumption, money, and leisure, but not the qualitative outcomes for
dierent policies. To test this expectation we simulate the model by assigning diverse
values to parameters. The results are given in Table 1.4. As we see the results are robust
to changes in parameters, i.e., total welfare is maximized under disciplined scal policy
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and the ordering of policies under undisciplined scal policy does not change.
Table 1.4: Robustness tests
Parameters aect only the distribution of resources in the economy but not the relative
performance of scal and monetary regimes. The eects of parameter changes on levels
are reasonable. For example, if the representative agent puts more weight on money
holdings (χ′ > χ), the nominal value of money holdings and the total welfare increases
while all other endogenous variables remain constant6. Or if the share of tradable goods
in the aggregate consumption (θ) is higher than the share of non-tradables (as opposed to
the benchmark calibration where the representative household puts slightly more weight
on non-tradable goods), the total welfare increases. This happens because the factors
of production move towards the tradable sector in order to meet increased demand for
manufactured goods. Or in the benchmark case we assumed that productivity is higher in
the non-tradable sector (A < B). If we assume the opposite (A′ > B′), the economy uses
more factors of production to produce the tradable goods and the total welfare declines.
6 This is the only case when a laissez-faire regime delivers a higher total welfare compared to other
monetary regimes. The reason is straightforward: the regime that stabilizes money supply has an
advantage when money has unusually high weight in the utility function.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the eectiveness of dierent monetary regimes in a small, resource-
rich, developing economy in a DSGE framework. The welfare analysis provided in this
paper aims to shed new light on the specied role of certain monetary actions under
certain conditions. In the model presented we mainly focus on the case where government
spends revenues from natural resource exports without any discipline. In contrast, the
monetary policy is set freely and the central bank independently chooses between one of
three given regimes: (i) xed exchange rate, (ii) price level targeting, and (iii) laissez-
faire. Such a combination of scal and monetary policies is observed in most developing
countries with abundant natural resources.
The calibration and simulation of the model show that the exchange rate and price
level targeting regimes outperform the laissez-faire regimes. In particular, we nd that
under these regimes consumption is smoothed and the domestic economy partially iso-
lated from the uctuations in revenues from natural resource exports. This is achieved
through the intensive use of foreign exchange interventions by the central bank. Therefore
the accumulation/decumulation of natural resource revenues in the form of central banks'
international assets allows the softening of the negative eects of Dutch Disease during
high natural resource revenues and stabilizes the economy in the face of volatile natural
resource revenues. Another important nding of the paper is that the economy is less
vulnerable to shocks in foreign revenues under a xed exchange rate regime than price
level targeting. Hence a xed exchange rate regime delivers the highest total welfare and
the lowest welfare cost of a business cycle. The evaluation of the loss function is highly
dependent upon the central bank's preferences related to output gap stabilization and
ination stabilization. These results conrm the eectiveness of particular monetary poli-
cies in the allocation problem when there are large, uncertain natural resource revenues
and undisciplined scal policy in the short run.
The ndings of this paper provide support for the central bank to target exchange rate
stability when the government pursues scal expansion. The model depicts the situation
observed in Azerbaijan, an oil and gas rich developing post-Soviet economy during the
last decade. However, the results of the paper can be applied to other natural resource
rich developing economies and also to aid receiving countries due to similarities between
aid and natural resource revenue inows.
There are several perspectives for future research on this topic and the model can
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be enriched by introducing additional assumptions. For example, it might be of some
interest to include prudential investment and hybrid monetary rules in the model. This
would enable estimation of an optimal spending-saving strategy from the scal policy
perspective and a precise exchange rate regime from the monetary policy perspective.
Such an assumption will improve the results because in reality not all natural resource
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Derivation of the Price Index












































































1.A.2 Solution of the Households' Problem











) + ψLn(1− Lt)
]
,
subject to budget constraint

























Mt−1 + etτtFt +WtLt +RtK + Πt −Mt − etCMt − PNt CNt
]
}. (1.7)
Now we can derive the rst order conditions:
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− βtϑtet = 0; (1.8)
[CNt ] : β
tζ(1− θ) 1
CNt









+ βtϑtWt = 0; (1.11)
[ϑt] : Mt−1 + etτtFt +WtLt +RtK + Πt −Mt − etCMt − PNt CNt = 0. (1.12)









































































































































From (1.14) we get CNt =
(1−θ)etCMt
θPNt












1.A.3 Solution of the Firms' Problem

















1−α = Rt; (1.18)
[LMt ] : (1− α)PMt A(KMt )α(LMt )−α = Wt; (1.19)
Max
{KNt LNt }
{PNt B(KNt )γ(LNt )1−γ −RtKNt −WtLNt }; (1.20)






1−γ = Rt; (1.21)
[LNt ] : (1− γ)PNt B(KNt )γ(LNt )−γ = Wt. (1.22)


























































As we see α and γ determine how the price ratio is related to the capital-labor ratio.
To understand how it works, assume that there is an increase in the capital-labor ratio in
the non-tradable sector driven by a rise in the natural resource revenues. Under a xed
exchange regime if α > γ, Pt increases, and if α < γ, Pt decreases.
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1.A.4 Structural Form of the Model
• endogenous variables: Ct, CMt , CNt , et, Pt, PMt , PNt ,Mt, Lt, LMt , LNt , KMt , KNt ,Wt,
Rt,Φt, St, Y, Y
M , Y N
• exogenous variables: Ft, τt, µt























5. PMt = et
6. Pt = (PMt )
θ(PNt )
1−θ




1−α + (τt − µt)Ft















11. (1− α)PMt A(KMt )α(LMt )−α = Wt
12. (1− γ)PNt B(KNt )γ(LNt )−γ = Wt
13. Φt = Φt−1 + (1− τt)Ft
14. Mt = Mt−1 + etµtFt
15. St = St−1 + µtFt
16. K = KMt +K
N
t
17. Lt = LMt + L
N
t















In the steady state F is xed, the scal authority and the central bank do not take any
action, and consequently τt equals one and µt equals zero and all endogenous variables
are constant. Therefore in the steady-state we have the following equations:



























































11. (1− α)PMA(KM)α(LM)−α = W
12. (1− γ)PNB(KN)γ(LN)−γ = W





















16. µ = 0
17. τ = 1



























ζLn(Ct(1 + η)) + χLn(
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Determinants of the Choice of Exchange Rate
Regime in Resource-Rich Countries
Abstract
This chapter studies the specic determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime
in resource-rich countries. We run multinomial logit regressions for an unbalanced panel
data set of 145 countries over 1975-2004. We nd that resource-rich countries are more
likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime compared to resource-poor countries. Fur-
thermore, we provide evidence that output volatility contributes to the likelihood of
choosing a xed exchange rate regime, positively in resource-rich countries and negatively
in resource-poor countries. We believe that in resource-rich countries a xed exchange
rate regime is mainly preferred due to its stabilization function in the face of turbulent
foreign exchange inows. Moreover, our results reveal that the role of democracy and
independent central banks in choosing more exible exchange rate regimes is stronger
in resource-rich countries. In resource-rich countries that possess non-democratic insti-
tutions and non-independent central banks, the government is less accountable for its
spending of natural resource revenues and scal dominance prevails. In this situation,
uctuations in natural resource revenues are more easily transmitted into the domestic
economy and therefore a xed exchange rate becomes a more favorable option.
An earlier version of this paper has been published in Aliyev, R., 2014, Determinants of the Choice
of Exchange Rate Regime in Resource-Rich Countries, CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, No. 527.
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2.1 Introduction
In the economic literature much attention has been devoted to the choice of exchange
rate regime. Often policymakers are challenged to choose between a xed exchange rate
regime, which may provide trade gains and a policy crutch, and a oating exchange
rate regime, which does not undermine the independence of monetary policy and accom-
modates the terms of trade shocks. The problem of choosing an appropriate exchange
rate strategy is even sharper in resource-rich countries (RRCs) that are exposed to large
and volatile foreign exchange inows. There is empirical evidence that fuel exporters are
more likely to have a pegged exchange rate regime (Klein and Shambaugh, 2009). Such
behavior may have a rationale, as a natural resource exporting economy facing volatile
and huge foreign exchange inows may benet from pegging its currency to the dollar
(Aliyev, 20121) or to the oil price (Frankel, 2003). Questions then arise as to whether
RRCs benet from any extra stabilization advantages of pegging and what determines the
choice of exchange rate regime in these countries. To our knowledge there is no empirical
study that focuses on these questions.
The main objective of this work is to address these questions by focusing on the
specic determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in RRCs. Given the nature
of the dependent variable, which is a categorical variable that denes dierent exchange
rate regimes, we run multinomial logit regressions for an unbalanced panel data set of
145 countries over the 1975-2004 period. We incorporate dierent theories that aim to
explain the determinants of the exchange rate regime. Besides various variables from the
literature, our study also includes additional variables that could be interesting from the
point of view of RRCs. We expect that a specic set of variables, such as democracy,
output volatility, central bank independence, and scal discipline may aect the choice
of exchange rate regime dierently in RRCs. To check this expectation we analyze the
multiplicative eect of these variables with a resource-richness variable on the choice of
exchange rate regime.
We have to note that the results of this chapter cannot be interpreted as supportive
of the rst chapter, since the rst paper is more normative than predictive. However, the
specic role of exchange rate stabilization in RRCs through foreign reserve management
by the central bank, explained in the rst chapter, inspired us to empirically study the
1Aliyev (2012) in a theoretical framework predicts that, under certain conditions, pegging the ex-
change rate allows the softening of the negative eects of Dutch Disease and partially stabilizes the
economy in the face of volatile natural resource revenues.
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determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in RRCs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the
theories of the determinants and classication of exchange rate regimes and discusses
some important issues related to exchange rate regimes in RRCs. Section 3 describes our
methodology and data. The results and ndings are presented in section 4 and section 5
concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Theoretical Determinants of Exchange Rate Regime Choice
Until recently the economic literature extensively studied the growth eects of exchange
rate regimes (Gosh et al., 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger, 2003; Husain et al., 2004).
More recent literature draws the possible endogeneity of the choice of exchange rate regime
to the front line and rather focuses on the determinants of this choice than its eects on
macroeconomic variables (Berdiev et al., 2012; Levy-Yeyati et al., 2010; Markiewicz,
2006; Von Hagen and Zhou, 2007). In the economic literature three major approaches
that explain the choice of exchange rate regimes are (i) Optimal Currency Area (OCA)
theory, (ii) nancial view, and (iii) political view. Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger (2010)
provide an extensive review on how these three theories emerged. All these theories
have been empirically tested by many scholars who analyze the determination process of
exchange rate regimes.
According to theOCA theory (originally formulated by Mundell, 1961) geographical
location, trade links, size, openness, and intrinsic shocks are the main determinants of the
exchange rate regime. From this perspective the trade and welfare gains from a stable
exchange rate are compared with the benets of exchange rate exibility as a shock
absorber. For instance, more open countries are more likely to have a pegged regime. Or,
given the fact that smaller countries trade more, one can expect that these countries also
tend to have less exible regimes.
The Financial view is based on the impossible trinity hypothesis, according to which
only two out of three goals can be attained: exchange rate stabilization, free capital mobil-
ity, and independent monetary policy. Recent global nancial deepening and innovation
diminished the eectiveness of capital controls. In the presence of free capital mobility the
impossible trinity dilemma is reduced to the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes, which
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denes a xed exchange rate regime and independent monetary policy tradeo. Accord-
ing to this view, low nancial development should increase the probability of adopting
pegs.
The Political view highlights political factors as a determinant of an exchange rate
regime. Less developed countries experiencing low institutional credibility may adopt
a peg as a policy crutch. These countries are more corrupted and have a higher level
of bureaucracy. Therefore, they need to have a stable currency to attract international
investors and possibly to provide illegal opportunities for inuential members of society.
In contrast, in more democratic countries governments are more interested in inuencing
the economy and hence are more likely to use exible regimes.
2.2.2 Classication of Exchange Rate Regimes
The classication of exchange rate regimes deserves some explanation. Until recently
most of the research relied on a de jure exchange rate regime classication which is based
on countries' ocial announcements to the IMF (IMF's Annual Report on Exchange
Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions). However, in practice, countries usually
demonstrate fear of oating and do not allow their exchange rate to oat against their o-
cial reports (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger, 2005). Therefore,
using de facto regime classications which describe the exchange rate strategies better
than de jure regime classications is growing in popularity.
Levy-Yeyati and Struzeneggers' (2003, 2005) de facto exchange rate regime classi-
cation is based on the volatility of the bilateral nominal exchange rate, the volatility of
exchange rate changes and the volatility of foreign reserves. Reinhart and Rogos' (2004)
approach is more sophisticated and accounts for country chronologies, which includes in-
formation on the ocial exchange rate regime, the anchor currency and other important
economic events and dierences between the ocial and parallel exchange rates.
The codings of all three directions (de jure classication by IMF, de facto classica-
tions by Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger, 2003-2005, and by Reinhart and Rogo, 2004)
have been widely used by many scholars and the studies based on de facto classications
signicantly dier from the ones that are based on de jure classication.2 For exam-
ple, Ghosh et al. (2003) use de jure exchange rate regime classication and nd that a
xed exchange rate regime has a positive eect on economic growth. Levy-Yeyati and
2See Harms and Kretschmann (2009) for an extensive survey.
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Struzenegger (2010) by using their own de facto classication nd empirical support for
three approaches about the exchange rate regime choice discussed above. Berdiev et
al. (2010) use the same classication and emphasize the role of political factors such
as wings of governments (left/right), democratic institutions, central bank independence
and nancial development, among other factors determining the choice of exchange rate
regime. Estimations based on the alternative de facto classication of Reinhart and Ro-
go (2004) indicate that only rich and nancially developed countries can benet from
the exibility of exchange rate regimes (Reinhart and Rogo, 2004; Husain et al., 2005;
Aghion et al., 2009).
The general conclusion is that countries usually deviate from their ocial announce-
ments and hence research that is based on de facto classications delivers more reasonable
results. Therefore, in our study we use three-way and ve-way classications proposed
by Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger (2003).
2.2.3 Exchange Rate Regimes in RRCs
The literature agrees that there is no single right exchange rate regime for all countries
(Frankel, 1999) and often focuses on a special set of determinants and group of countries
with similar characteristics. RRCs dier from other countries by experiencing a huge and
volatile inow of foreign exchange. In the face of these windfalls RRCs are challenged
to achieve stabilization in the short run, and economic growth in the long run. Klein
and Shambaugh (2009) nd that fuel exporters are more likely to peg compared to non-
fuel exporting countries. Moreover, it has been documented that the price of oil has a
signicant eect on real exchange rates in oil rich countries, more precisely, a higher oil
price leads to appreciation of the real exchange rate in these countries (Korhonen and
Juurikkala, 2009). The eects of oil price changes on the domestic economy are mainly
transmitted through scal policy (Husain et al., 2008).
The intuition behind these phenomena is straightforward: soaring oil prices or the
discovery of natural resource reserves increase a government's income denominated in
foreign exchange and scal expansion nanced through these resources creates apprecia-
tion pressure on the domestic currency. In this situation, a monetary authority can choose
only one out of the two sides of the stick: it can either stabilize the nominal exchange rate
at the cost of high ination or it can control ination by allowing the nominal exchange
rate to adjust.
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The evidence supports the contention that monetary authorities in RRCs mainly
choose the rst option. Aliyev (2012) shows that besides arguments of existing theories of
exchange rate determination there may be an additional rationale to peg the exchange rate
in resource-rich developing countries. More precisely, under undisciplined scal policy3
by xing the exchange rate monetary authorities in RRCs may contribute to achieving
consumption smoothing across generations and softening the negative eects of Dutch
Disease during a boom. Therefore, it could be interesting to study the role of certain
factors in the determination of exchange rate regimes in RRCs. To our best knowledge
there is no empirical study that concentrates on this issue, and we are trying to ll
this gap by focusing on a specic set of determinants such as macroeconomic volatility,
democracy, central bank independence, and scal discipline.
2.3 Methodology and Data
2.3.1 Econometric Model
Given the nature of the dependent variable - which is a categorical variable that takes
three values4 - we run multinomial ordered logit regressions for an unbalanced panel data
set. This technique is the most relevant in a discrete choice analysis since the choice set
includes more than two ordered alternatives.5
The econometric literature suggests using a country xed-eects model on panel data.
However, a country-specic xed-eects model may produce inconsistent results if maxi-
mum likelihood estimator (MLE) is used. In the panel data with T observations within
each group of N, MLE is consistent if T tends to innity. A xed eect model can give
inconsistent estimators if T is small and N tends to innity (see Chamberlain, 1980).
Given the small number of years in our database we abandon the idea of using country
xed-eects model in our estimations.
The discrete variable yit denotes the choice of exchange rate regime by country i at
period t and is dened as:
3In this context, undisciplined scal policy denes a situation when windfall revenues are spent in the
short run, while under disciplined scal policy scal spending is maintained relatively constant in the
long run.
4To check the robustness of our results, besides 3-way classication we also use the 5-way classication
in section 2.4.1.
5The information criteria of Akaike, Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn do not clearly favor any model, so




j = 1, if country i at period t implements a exible regime,
j = 2, if country i at period t implements an intermediate regime,
j = 3, if country i at period t implements a xed regime.
(2.1)
The probability of choosing regime j is denoted by pj, such that
∑3
j=1 pj = 1. The
choice of exchange rate regime is described by a latent variable y∗i,t which denotes the
unobserved utility that government i derives in year t from a xed regime. y∗i,t is deter-
mined as a linear function of dierent explanatory variablesXi,t, natural resource-richness
dummy Dnri,t and its interaction term with the specic set of variables Zi,t (Zi,t ⊂ Xi,t):




i,t×Zi,t + ui,t, for i = 1, 2, ..., N ; t = 1, 2, ..., Ti. (2.2)
Where N denotes the number of countries and Ti is the number of observations for
country i. We assume that the error term ui,t is i.i.d. with standard logistic distribution.
The probabilities of country i choosing regime j at period t are dened in the following
way:
yi,t = 1 if y∗i,t < c1 and Pr(yi,t = 1) = Pr(y
∗
i,t < c1),
yi,t = 2 if c1 < y∗i,t < c2 and Pr(yi,t = 2) = Pr(c1 < y
∗
i,t < c2),




where c1 and c2 (c1 < c2) are thresholds dening the edges between dierent regimes.
The estimates of all the coecients and thresholds c1 and c2 are obtained by using the
maximum likelihood technique.
In order to reduce the potential endogeneity we use lagged values for some explanatory
variables. This correction for endogeneity bias may not be a sucient solution. Some
authors try to resolve the endogeneity problem by replacing the variables with their initial
values or by using the instrumental variables. However, due to certain limitations these
techniques are ineective in dealing with the endogeneity problem.
The list of control variables Xi,t and their classication according to dierent ap-
proaches are given in Table 2.1. Most of these explanatory variables are taken from the
standard literature and the reasoning behind them is described in the literature review
section. The predictions of the OCA theory are tested by including the country's open-
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ness and its size. A-priori, we expect that larger and more open countries are more likely
to adopt more exible exchange rate regimes. To test the Financial view we include
the ratio of private credit to GDP as a measure of the nancial development and the
Chinn-Ito index which measures a country's degree of capital account openness.6 To
capture the eects of Political factors on the choice of exchange rate regime we use
central bank independence index, democracy dummy and ination rate. According to the
Political view, countries with more independent central banks and democratic societies
would prefer a oating exchange rate. Central bank independence indicates how political
conicts around choices over exchange rate regimes are solved. In other words, this mea-
sure points out to what extent monetary authorities can oppose pressures by the ruling
party. For example, prior to elections a exible exchange rate regime may look a more
attractive option for policymakers since such a policy may achieve employment growth
and facilitate their likelihood of reelection. In this situation, a credible independent cen-
tral bank will not forego its own interests to defend the political interests of the ruling
party. Therefore, central bank independence is included among other determinants of
the exchange rate regime. Ination can be the focus of a government that tries to build
up a reputation by attaining monetary stability. For instance, a government favoring low
ination may choose a xed exchange rate regime.
Besides these variables, we also control for three additional variables and their inter-
action terms with a resource-richness dummy: volatility of GDP, the cyclicality of scal
policy, and scal elasticity (the elasticity of government consumption expenditure to in-
come). The independent eects of these additional variables need to be explained. The
eect of GDP volatility on the choice of exchange rate regime is pretty straightforward
since the later has a direct impact on economic activity in the short run. The exchange
rate is used extensively among other policy tools in dealing with macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion. The cyclicality and elasticity of scal expenditure have similar eects on the choice
of exchange rate regime. Both variables can be an important determinant of the choice
of exchange rate regime, especially in natural-resource exporting countries. For instance,
in an undisciplined scal environment where scal policy is procyclical or scal elasticity
is high, an oil exporting economy is challenged by volatility in the money market. In this
situation a pegged regime may serve as a shock absorber.7
6Because of a large number of missing data in our estimations we do not include liability dollarization,
a variable commonly used in the literature for testing the Financial view. Surprisingly, in the robustness
test the dollarization variable appears to be insignicant.
7A mechanism of how exchange rate regime aects macroeconomic stabilization and how scal disci-
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Table 2.1: Variable denitions and sources
In line with these three variables we also focus on the interaction of democracy and
central bank independence with the resource-richness dummy. These two variables are
related with the accountability of government and may carry extra importance in RRCs
where scal dominance is a major issue.
pline shapes the overall macroeconomic situation is extensively explained in Aliyev (2012).
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2.3.2 Data Analysis
The full sample contains annual observations for 120 developing and 25 developed coun-
tries over the 1975-2004 period. The list of all variables and their sources is given in
Table 2.1. Table 2.5 in Appendix 2.A.1 lists all the countries in our sample. Most of the
macroeconomic data are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and
World Economic Outlook (WEO) by the IMF, World Development Indicators (WDI) by
the World Bank, and from the United Nations Statistics Division. A detailed summary
statistics about dierent variables is provided in Table 2.6 in Appendix 2.A.1.
We borrow the de facto exchange rate regime classication from Levy-Yeyati and
Struzenegger (2003, 2005). Specically we use two ways of classication, named lys_3
for three-way classication and lys_5 for ve-way classication.
As a measure of size we use a natural logarithm of real GDP. To control openness
we employ two measures: de facto capital account openness (open), estimated as the
GDP share of the average of exports plus imports, and de jure capital account openness
(ka_open) measured by the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2008). We also control for
CPI as a measure of ination. Financial development is captured by the ratio of domestic
credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP. The democracy variable (dem) comes
from Cheibub (2010). The distribution of number of observations according to democracy
and resource-richness is given in Table 2.7 in Appendix 2.A.1. Based on visual inspection
we can see that the majority of RRCs are non-democratic.
We use the central bank independence index from Arnone et al. (2007) and Klomp
and De Haan (2009).8 Central bank independence is built based on two indicators of
central bank autonomy: (i) political autonomy, the ability of the central bank to choose
the objectives of monetary policy, and (ii) economic autonomy, the ability of the central
bank to choose its instruments (the methodology is proposed by Grilli et al., 1991).
In our specication a country is considered natural resource exporting if its natural
resource (ores, metals, and fuel) exports' share is larger than one half of total merchandize
exports. Although the threshold may seem large, countries exposed to a windfall of huge
natural resource revenues lie in our interest area. GDP volatility is measured as a standard
deviation of the growth rate of GDP over a rolling centered ve-year period.
We use two alternative measures of scal discipline: (i) the scal cyclicality (fis_cyc)
and (ii) the elasticity of government consumption (fis_el). To estimate the cyclicality
8We are grateful to Jeroen Klomp, Jakob de Haan and Davide Romelli for providing us with the data.
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measure we run the following regression of the growth of real government expenditures
on real GDP growth (similar to Woo, 2009).
lnGi,t − lnGi,t−1 = δi + βi[lnYi,t − lnYi,t−1] + εi,t (2.4)
Fiscal elasticity is estimated as the ratio of the percentage change in government
consumption to the percentage change in GDP. This variable reects how much gov-
ernment expenditure responds to changes in income. For example, high values of the
fis_eli,t would mean that government i at period t simultaneously increases/decreases
scal expenditures in response to increase/decrease in GDP.
To test for multicollinearity among the variables we estimate the variance ination
factor (VIF) and the condition index. The test results do not indicate the presence of
strong multicollinearity. The correlation among independent variables is also weak (Table
2.8 in Appendix 2.A.1).
Figure 2.1: Distribution of countries according to exchange rate regimes
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From the rst-pass over the data it is interesting to explore the distribution of ex-
change rate regimes across countries (Figure 2.1). As can easily be seen from the gure,
RRCs adopt a xed exchange rate regime more frequently as compared to resource-
poor countries. In 1980, 86% of RRCs adopted a xed exchange rate regime, though
this number was 70% among resource-poor countries. In 2004 the relative disparity be-
tween resource-rich and resource-poor countries remained (a xed exchange rate regime
is adopted by 70% of resource-rich and by 56% of resource-poor countries), though the
overall popularity of a xed exchange rate regime dropped in both groups.
2.4 Results
Our main results are summarized in Tables 2.2 - 2.4: Table 2.2 illustrates our estimation
results for the full set of countries, Tables 2.3 and 2.4 display the results for developing
and developed countries respectively9. First, we estimate the parameters of the model
with only the main eects (column 1) and then include interaction terms (columns 2 - 6).
The eects of control variables on the choice of exchange rate regime are consistent
with those found in the literature. Size has negative coecients in all specications,
meaning that larger countries are less likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime. Pos-
itive coecients on openness indicate that more open countries are more likely to use a
xed exchange rate regime. These two ndings are consistent with the principles of the
OCA theory.10
We also conrm that higher central bank independence is associated with more ex-
ible exchange rate regimes. A xed exchange rate regime constraints the central bank
to conducting independent monetary policy and a exible exchange rate regime enables
the central bank to have full control over the monetary policy decisions (Siklos, 2008).
Therefore, a more exible exchange rate regime is more likely to be used by an inde-
pendent central bank. Our results indicate that democratic countries are more likely to
adopt exible exchange rate regimes. Such a regime allows the government to conduct
monetary policy toward domestic stabilization purposes. Democratic countries are more
transparent and possess politically accountable institutions. These ndings about central
9The reason for us splitting the sample into developing and developed countries is that there are only
a few developed countries that export natural resources in large quantities and it would be more proper
to focus on developing countries that share many similarities.
10Berdiev et al. (2012), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010), Von Hagen and Zhou (2007) among many others
nd similar results.
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bank independence and democracy are intuitive and in line with the Political view.
Table 2.2: Multinomial ordered logistic regression estimates: full sample
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Table 2.3: Multinomial ordered logistic regression estimates: developing countries
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Table 2.4: Multinomial ordered logistic regression estimates: developed countries
The negative sign on the coecient of ination indicates that higher rates of ination
lower the likelihood of a xed regime. This result is similar to the ndings of Berdiev et al.
(2012) and Markiewicz (2006). One explanation for this nding could be that it is dicult
to maintain a stable exchange rate in countries with high levels of consumer prices. Hence
high ination rates may undermine the credibility of a xed regime, and force a country
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to move towards a exible regime. Another explanation for this relationship could be
that a xed exchange rate regime may cause low rates of ination.
Positive coecients on the nancial development measure in developing countries im-
ply that greater nancial development increases the probability of a xed exchange rate
regime in these countries. This nding can be explained through a high correlation of
nancial deepness with denominated debt and greater currency mismatches in developing
countries (Berdiev, 2012; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2005; Levy-Yeyati et al., 2010).
However, in developed countries the Financial view holds, since higher nancial develop-
ment is associated with more exible exchange rate regimes. Capital account openness
has a signicant and positive coecient for the full sample, but it is insignicant if de-
veloped and developing countries are analyzed separately.
Our notable nding is that the probability of implementing a pegged exchange rate
regime is higher in RRCs compared to resource-poor countries. This result is depicted in
Figure 2.2, where we obtain dierent probabilities by holding all other explanatory vari-
ables at their mean. A similar conclusion has been documented by Klein and Shambaugh
(2009) for fuel exporting countries. Our study extends their results to all natural resource
exporting countries. The incentives of RRCs to choose pegging are explained through
the stabilization function of the exchange rate and are extensively described above. We
believe that on the background of large and volatile foreign exchange inows, pegging the
exchange rate might have a rationale: in a natural resource exporting economy a xed
exchange rate regime may seem the best option to achieve short-term stabilization.
Figure 2.2: Probabilities of the choices of exchange rate regimes
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Figure 2.3: Probabilities of choosing xed and oating exchange rate regimes in
developing countries: democracy
Now we can analyze the interaction terms of the natural resource-richness dummy
with some other variables. The coecient on the interaction term of democracy and the
resource-richness dummy (dem x nr) is negative for the full sample and for developing
countries.11 The way democracy inuences the eect of resource-richness on the choice of
exchange rate regime can be better seen in Figure 2.3. As we can see, democratic countries
are less likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime both in resource-rich and resource-
poor countries. However, the eect of democracy is stronger in resource-rich countries
since we observe a steeper slope for resource-rich countries and a atter slope for resource-
poor countries. If we look at the interaction coecient from a dierent perspective, we can
observe that resource-richness increases the probability of a xed exchange rate regime
in all countries, though this eect is weaker in democratic countries. Therefore, we can
conclude that in RRCs democratic institutions play a stronger role in supporting more
exible exchange rate regimes.
11The interaction terms for developed countries do not primarily lie in our focus, since among these
countries only Norway is classied as a resource-rich country.
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Figure 2.4: Probabilities of choosing a xed exchange rate regime in developing
countries: output volatility, central bank independence, and scal cyclicality
The multiplicative eects of output volatility, central bank independence, and scal
cyclicality with a resource-richness dummy in developing countries are depicted in Figure
2.4. The interaction eect of GDP volatility and resource-richness is signicant at the
1% and 10% levels in the full sample and in the developing countries respectively. This
multiplicative eect unveils another interesting relation: the probability of adoption of a
xed exchange rate regime decreases in resource-poor countries and increases in resource-
rich countries with higher values of output volatility. In RRCs the output mainly consists
of natural resources and hence, the uctuations in natural resource extraction and exports
are the main sources of output volatility in these countries. Therefore, we can conclude
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that in RRCs a xed exchange rate regime is mainly preferred because of high volatility
of natural resource revenues.
Previous studies have shown that central bank independence decreases the probability
of a xed exchange rate regime. In line with this phenomenon our results indicate that
the eect of central bank autonomy is more pronounced in resource-rich countries as
compared to resource-poor ones. In other words RRCs are more likely to abandon a xed
exchange rate regime if they possess more independent central banks.
We obtain signicant eects of scal cyclicality and its interaction with the resource-
richness dummy on the choice of exchange rate regime. According to our results, countries
with procyclical scal policies are less likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime, mean-
ing that if we move from countries with countercyclical policies towards countries with
procyclical scal policies, the probability of adopting a xed exchange rate regime dimin-
ishes. This can be due to diculties in maintaining exchange rate stability in countries
where governments pursue a procyclical scal policy. We observe that if scal policy is
countercyclical, then RRCs are more likely to peg their exchange rate. However, when
scal policy becomes procyclical, the probability of pegging in RRCs drops below the
probability of pegging in resource-poor countries. A procyclical scal policy in RRCs 
a situation when the government changes scal expenditure in response to changes in
income from natural resource exports  might make it even more dicult to achieve a
pegged exchange rate regime.
Fiscal elasticity increases the overall probability of a xed exchange rate regime, mean-
ing that adoption of a xed exchange rate regime is more likely in countries where the
response of scal expenditure to changes in income is high. Its multiplication eect with
resource-richness is insignicant.
2.4.1 Robustness Checks
All our robustness checks are given in Appendix 2.A.2. To test the robustness of our
results, rst, we estimate the model with a 5-way exchange rate regime classication,
instead of the 3-way classication used in our benchmark specication12. Some economists
believe that distinguishing among oaters, xers and intermediate regimes is enough.
Others argue that there is a need for more detailed classication and split intermediate
12Basically it is rather a 4-way classication, since there are only 9 observations (0.33% of total) that
belong to the inconclusive category. Observations with these categories are dropped in order to keep the
consistency of ordered logit estimations.
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regimes into crawling peg and dirty oats. To make sure that our results are robust to
this modication we use 5-way classication. The results for developing countries with
5-way classication are described in Table 2.1013. One can easily check that the signs and
signicance of the coecients are similar in both classications. The main dierences are
in the relative values of the coecients.
We also focus solely on fuel exporting countries instead of all natural resource export-
ing countries. The results with fuel exporting developing countries are summarized in
Table 2.11. As we can see, new coecients do not signicantly dier from the ones in
the benchmark specication.
As the nal test, we estimate our model with additional control variables: interest rate,
years oce, and dollarization. To measure the interest rate we use the lending interest
rate from WDI. Years oce is obtained from the Database of Political institutions
2012, and indicates how many years the chief executive has been in oce. And for
dollarization, we use the deposit dollarization ratio (foreign currency deposits over total
deposits) assembled by Levy and Yeyati (2006).
The estimation results with these additional variables are summarized in Table 2.12.
We can see that, with the additional variables, the number of observations is reduced
more than threefold. Therefore, direct comparison of the new results with the benchmark
specication is inappropriate. With the additional variables the eect of capital account
openness becomes insignicant and nancial development obtains signicant coecients.
Interest rate and years the chief executive has been in oce are both insignicant.
A-priori we could expect that to deal with high dollarization a xed exchange rate
regime may be preferred, since stability of the exchange rate may increase the condence
of residents in the domestic currency. However, our estimation results indicate that higher
levels of dollarization are associated with a lower probability of a xed regime in all
specications. We believe that in this relationship the eect works in a reverse direction.
A pegged exchange rate regime increases the faith of residents in the domestic currency
as they switch from foreign currency to domestic and dollarization falls. Therefore, we
observe negative coecients on the dollarization variable.
13The results for the full set of countries and for developing countries are also similar to the benchmark
results, so we do not report them.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime in 145
countries over the period 1975-2004 by primarily focusing on RRCs. As other studies have
found, we conrm that size, openness, nancial development, central bank independence,
and democracy are important determinants of the choice of exchange rate regime.
Moreover, our results reveal that RRCs are more likely to adopt a xed exchange
rate regime compared to resource-poor countries. We think that on the background of
large and volatile foreign exchange inows, there may be a rationale for pegging the
exchange rate. In a natural resource exporting economy a xed exchange rate regime
may seem the best option to achieve short-term stabilization. The data provides support
for this position: the probability of adoption of a xed exchange rate regime decreases
in resource-poor countries and increases in resource-rich countries with higher values of
output volatility. In RRCs the output mainly consists of natural resources, and therefore
the uctuations in natural resource extraction and exports are the main sources of output
volatility. Therefore, we can conclude that in RRCs a xed exchange rate regime is mainly
preferred due to its stabilization function in the face of turbulent foreign exchange inows.
Our study nds that democracy and central bank independence aect the choice of
exchange rate regime dierently in RRCs. Estimations show that democratic countries are
less likely to adopt a xed exchange rate regime regardless of whether they are resource
rich or poor. However, we nd that the eect of democracy is stronger in resource-
rich countries. In other words, in RRCs, democratic institutions play a stronger role in
supporting more exible exchange rate regimes. Previous studies have shown that central
bank independence decreases the probability of a xed exchange rate regime. In line with
this phenomenon, our results indicate that the eect of central bank autonomy is more
pronounced in resource-rich countries as compared to resource-poor ones. This implies
that in RRCs, more independent central banks are more inclined to choose a exible
exchange rate regime.
In resource-rich countries with non-democratic institutions and non-independent cen-
tral banks, the government is less accountable for its spending of natural resource revenues
and scal dominance is more likely. In this situation, uctuations in natural resource
revenues are more easily transmitted into the domestic economy and therefore a xed
exchange rate becomes a more favorable option.
According to our results, countries with procyclical scal policies are less likely to
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adopt a xed exchange rate regime, meaning that if we move from countries with counter-
cyclical policies towards those with procyclical scal policies, the probability of adopting
a xed exchange rate regime diminishes. This can be due to diculties in maintaining
exchange rate stability in countries where governments pursue a procyclical scal pol-
icy. We observe that if scal policy is countercyclical, then RRCs are more likely to peg
their exchange rate. However, when scal policy becomes procyclical, the probability of
pegging in RRCs drops below the probability of pegging in resource-poor countries. A
procyclical scal policy in RRCs  a situation when the government changes scal expen-
diture in response to changes in income from natural resource exports  might make it
even more dicult to achieve a pegged exchange rate regime.
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Abstract
This paper uses rm-level nancial data for Czech rms in the period from 2003
to 2011 and tests for the role of companies' nancial structure in the transmission of
monetary policy. Our results indicate that higher short-term interest rates coincide with
lower shares of total debt and long-term debt, and with higher shares of short-term
bank loans and trade credit. We nd that rm-specic characteristics, such as size, age,
collateral, and prot aect the way monetary policy inuences the external nancing
decisions of rms. These ndings indicate the presence of informational frictions in credit
markets and hence provide some empirical evidence of the existence of a broad credit
channel in the Czech Republic.
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3.1 Introduction
In a perfect-information world, changes in monetary policy rates would (via the interest
rate channel) aect the nancing decisions of rms directly by changing their borrowing
costs. However, in reality, credit market imperfections inuence bank lending and rm
nancing behavior and (via the broad credit channel) alter monetary policy transmission.
The extent to which changes in monetary policy rates transmit to client rates depends
on the functioning of nancial markets, which set the nancing costs for banks, and then
on the conditions on retail-lending markets. The rst part of the transmission tends to be
fast and complete; the second part, however, is slower and often incomplete, while being
heterogeneous across agents (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) and countries (e.g. Sørensen
and Werner, 2006). This has also been documented for the Czech Republic (Crespo-
Cuaresma, Égert, and Reininger, 2007; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007; Horváth and Podpiera,
2012). One of the primary reasons for the delays and unevenness in interest rate trans-
mission is the existence of information asymmetries among banks and clients; a bank's
imperfect knowledge about its client's economic situation increases the transaction cost
and hence the borrowing costs for the client. The information frictions typically amplify
the eects of the interest rate channel. Country-specic reasons for the heterogeneity in
transmission include dierences in the prevailing structure of nancing and in the level
of competition on the retail-banking market.
The concept of the broad credit channel addresses those aspects of monetary policy
transmission that the interest rate channel does not capture. It concerns the supply of
and demand for bank loans in general, or in a client-specic relationship. Several mecha-
nisms of operation of the broad credit channel have been established and analyzed in the
literature, most of them distinguishing between the eects of bank-level characteristics
and rm-level characteristics.
In this paper, we are interested in how rm-specic characteristics are reected in the
nancing structure of Czech rms. In order to control for and assess the eects of mon-
etary policy changes, we mainly follow the lines established in the literature regarding
the bank lending, balance sheet, and relationship channels. We look at rm-level data to
analyze rms' use of external nance. Our approach is to map the patterns in the nanc-
ing of entrepreneurial rms in the Czech Republic and their implications for monetary
policy transmission. We focus on the response of rms' external nancing indicators to
monetary policy rate changes. The heterogeneity of the individual responses - depending
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on the rm's size, age, collateral, and protability indicates the importance of the broad
credit channel for Czech monetary policy.
It is important to point out that Czech rm nancing is characterized by signicant
use of trade credit and non-bank nancing. Although bank loans are an important source
of nance, too, their share in the nancial liabilities of Czech rms is lower than in the
euro area (CNB, 2011). The use of market nancing by equity and commercial paper is
limited to a small number of large rms.
Evidence of the balance sheet channel of monetary transmission in the Czech Republic
has been limited. A notable exception is a study of balance sheet data and bankruptcy
information by Pospí²il and Schwarz (2014), who nd evidence of nancial constraints
for small Czech rms after 2008.
Our study extends the empirical evidence in two respects: First, we cover 2003-2011
and use rm-level balance sheet data for about 57,000 Czech rms. This allows us to
analyze recent developments in rms' balances and describe the recent patterns in rm
nancing. Second, we directly focus on the role of rm-specic characteristics such as
age, size, protability, and collateral in the relationship between rm-level nancing and
monetary policy. Thus we are able to estimate the eects of information asymmetries
between rms and banks on the transmission of monetary policy, and contribute to the
debate about the importance of the broad credit channel with recent empirical evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we explore the existing
literature on the topic. In the third and fourth sections, we explain our methodology and
describe the data. The fth section reports our ndings and robustness tests, and the
sixth section concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The mechanism for the balance sheet channel is that, after a monetary tightening, exter-
nal nancing becomes scarce for rms and households with certain characteristics. For
instance, small rms are more likely to be more vulnerable to information asymmetries
arising from credit market frictions (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Oliner and Rudebusch,
1996). Less capitalized rms with weak balance sheets have lower access to bank credit
and/or a higher price of external funds as compared to large, well-capitalized rms. Banks
do not have perfect information and therefore approximate the creditworthiness of rms
by the strength of their balance sheets. In addition, banks tend to make their lending
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standards stricter in times of uncertainty. After a monetary tightening, individual rms'
bank debt may decrease, not only because of the rms' own reaction to the higher inter-
est rates but also because of banks' tightened lending standards, especially in a situation
where they cannot easily replace bank credit with other types of nancing. Hence, the
balance sheet position of a rm determines the accessibility of market funds for borrowing
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).
The eects of the balance sheet channel have been intensively analyzed on the micro
level from the point of view of the conditions faced by rms and households and their
nancing behavior (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Fidrmuc et al., 2009; Bougheas et al.,
2006). In the literature, dierent rm-specic indicators have been analyzed for their
role in the balance sheet channel. For example, De Haan and Sterken (2000) look at
the eects of corporate governance and nd that private rms are more dependent on
bank debt and external funds and thus more sensitive to changes in the monetary policy
conditions. Mizen and Yalcin (2002) and Bougheas et al. (2006) show that risky, young,
and small rms have decreased access to lending when monetary policy is tight. Also,
Prasad and Saibal Ghosh (2005) nd that corporations behave dierently depending on
ownership, size, and period.
However, changes in bank debt in the balance sheets of rms may also result from
shifts in the supply of bank debt alone. This channel became relatively important in some
countries during the recent economic and nancial crisis.1 Identication of the supply and
demand channels has featured in the literature since the debate between Kashyap et. al.
(1993 and 1996) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) and requires very detailed data to be
addressed correctly. For example, Jiménez et al. (2012) analyze a Spanish micro-dataset
with information on old and new loans, credit applications, and loan conditions, along
with rm and bank characteristics. Ciccarelli et al. (2010) use comprehensive data from
the U.S. and euro area bank lending surveys.
The so-called relationship lending channel assumes that the existence of a long-term
relationship between banks and their debtors alleviates information asymmetries (Boot,
2000; Elsas, 2005). This long-term relationship hence creates benets in terms of in-
tertemporal smoothing, increased credit availability, enhancement of borrower's project
payos, and more ecient decisions if borrowers face nancial distress (Petersen and
Rajan, 1994).
1The dierent sources of shocks to the supply of bank debt were discussed, for example, by Acharya
and Naqvi (2012) and Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006).
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As regards the relationship channel, Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Harho and Ko-
rting (1998) nd that companies who have a relationship with a nance provider have
easier access to loans. Alternative evidence is presented by De Haan and Sterken (2006),
who nd higher sensitivity of rms to monetary policy shocks in market-based systems
than in bank-based ones.
For the Czech Republic, the evidence on the balance sheet channel of monetary trans-
mission is limited and only covers the period up to 2003.2 Horváth (2006 and 2009) and
Fidrmuc et al. (2009) analyze nancial accelerator eects in rms' balance sheets in the
Czech Republic and nd that monetary policy has stronger eects on small rms than on
big ones and that debt structure and cash-ow have a signicant inuence on rm-level
interest rates.
Ger²l and Jakubík (2010) analyze the relationship banking channel in the Czech Re-
public and underline the high relevance of single relationship banking for small and young
rms in technology- and knowledge-intensive industries.
The methodology used in our paper provides an alternative view of the balance sheet
channel, by describing various measures of indebtedness of Czech rms, which is com-
plementary to previous analyses of nancial accelerator eects. Furthermore, besides the
eects of monetary policy on average debt ratios, our study extends the focus to dierent
rm-specic characteristics.
3.3 Methodology
We borrow our methodology mainly from Bougheas et al. (2006) and De Haan and
Sterken (2006). Following their approach we consider the impact of monetary policy on
dierent indicators of rms' external nancing, drawn from annual balance sheet data.
We analyze how these nancing indicators react to monetary policy changes depending
on rm heterogeneity, and control for rm-specic variables that may inuence capital
structure choices. To do so, we regress dierent nancing indicators on the monetary
policy variable; size, age, prot, collateral, gearing, and their interaction terms with
the monetary policy variable, as well as controlling for some other variables. Our basic
regression model is given below:
2Égert (2009) provides a description of the empirical evidence across the majority of monetary policy
transmission channels in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The bank lending channel is
analyzed by Pruteanu (2007) and Matousek and Sarantis (2009).
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Yi,t = α1 + α2MPt + βXi,t + γMPt ×Xi,t + α3∆GDPt−1 + εi,t (3.1)
where Yi,t denotes one of the following four debt ratios of rm i in period t:
TODEBT - the total debt to total assets ratio, i.e., the overall use of external debt
SHLOAN - the short-term bank loans to total assets ratio SHTRADE - the trade credit
to total assets ratio; this is a component of working capital which can be a substitute for
bank debt (Petersen and Rajan, 1997) LDEBT - the long-term debt to total assets ratio.
MPt is a monetary policy indicator, an increase in which corresponds to monetary
tightening. Following the standard literature we focus mainly on the short-term market
interest rate, which is typically closely linked to the monetary policy rate. As a measure
of the short-term interest rate we use the 3-month PRIBOR (Prague Interbank Oered
Rate). In the robustness test we check our results using the 1-year PRIBOR. Since interest
rates are yearly averages and balance sheet variables are indicators reported at the end
of the year, there is a lag in the eect of market rates on rms' nancing decisions.
Xi,t denotes rm-specic characteristics. These analyzed rm characteristics are:
SIZE  the natural logarithm of total assets (Kashyap and Stein, 1995).
AGE  the number of years in existence since 1996.3
COLLATERAL  the ratio of tangible xed assets to total assets.
PROFIT  the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets.
∆GDPt−1 is the one-year-lagged real GDP growth rate. This variable is included to
control for the business cycle.
εi,t is the error term.
We use a panel model to analyze the above-mentioned relationships.4 We test for a
xed versus a random eects structure of the model using a Hausman specication test
in order to determine the precise structure of the general model. In most cases the null
hypothesis of rm-specic eects being uncorrelated with the regressors was rejected and
hence the xed eect model is favored.
3We use this approach to quantify the rm's reputation build-up and relationship with nancial
institutions since the establishment of the free market economy. By picking 1996, we disregard some
initial years of transition, when the Czech banking sector failed to operate on prudent principles, which
led to bank consolidation and stabilization programs in 1995-1996.
4Given the possible endogeneity problem indicated in the literature, and a lack of good instruments,
we considered using the panel GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), as it ensures
eciency and consistency, being robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, especially on samples
with short time dimensions and large rm dimensions. However, the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions indicated that all the proposed instruments are invalid. Therefore, we do not report results
obtained using the Arellano and Bond GMM methodology.
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In analysing the relationship between monetary policy and loan supply, the identi-
cation is very important and deserves some explanation. Some studies use more detailed
data to meet this challenge. For example, Jiménez et al. (2012) use loan-level data to
separate loan supply from demand.5 Given the limitations of our dataset  which does
not contain detailed information about loan applications and their results, linked with
rm/bank-specic characteristics  we are not able to clearly identify supply and demand
eects.
3.4 Data
The data used in the main part of our paper comprise information on rms' yearly
balance sheets and nancial results from the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus6 database, and
macroeconomic data on interest rates and output from the CNB's ARAD time series
database, all for the 2003-2011 period.
Our nal sample contains about 312,000 observations for 57,000 rms from the man-
ufacturing, construction, wholesale, retail, car repair, and transport sectors. We include
only active rms belonging to all size categories (named very large, large, medium, and
small) in our analysis. The original raw data were much larger and included 1.5 billion
observations for about 530,000 rms for the 1993-2013 period. The availability of data
for 2012 and 2013 was rather limited, so we decided that 2011 would be the last year
of the data. In addition, irrespective of year, the nancial information for many of the
observations was incomplete, and there were occurrences of misleading and wrong num-
bers, such as negative total assets, inequality between total assets and total liabilities,
and components of total liabilities being larger than total liabilities. The raw data also
contained bankrupted, dissolved, in liquidation, and inactive rms (dened by health
status), which may not react to monetary policy changes properly. To obtain the nal
dataset, we excluded all the irrelevant observations. We also performed the Grubbs test
for outliers, which indicated that the data do not contain any outliers.
5Jiménez et al. (2012) use condential information from the Credit Register of Spain to study the
eects of bank specic characteristics on success of loan applications. Specically, they focus on how
banks' capital or liquidity positions inuence the probability of loan granting.
6Amadeus is a database of comparable nancial information for public and private companies across
Europe. It contains company nancial information in a standardized format created by Bureau van
Dijk to ensure cross-country comparability. The companies are included in the database based on the
availability of nancial data, or rm size if nancial data are not available. Financial information is
gathered from all available ocial sources.
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The summary statistics of the main variables are given in Table 3.1. All rm-specic
variables except AGE and SIZE are scaled by total assets.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Figure 3.3 in Appendix 3.A.1 describes the structure of liabilities averaged across
rms for dierent time periods and for dierent size and age categories.7 The results of
t-test of dierences between means of dierent debt ratios for dierent years, size and age
categories are also given in Table 3.5 in Appendix 3.A.1. The test results indicate that
there are signicant dierences between means for dierent categories. The nancing of
Czech rms, is on average, evenly divided between debt and shareholder funds (Figure
3.3, Panel a). More than three-quarters of the debt nancing is of a short-term nature on
average: total debt consists mainly of current liabilities, which is made up mostly of trade
credit and other current liabilities, while short-term bank loans provide a relatively small
proportion of the funds. Just over half of the non-current liabilities are in long-term bank
debt. Panel b in Figure 3.3 depicts how the structure of the debt has changed over the
last decade. We observe that there was very little variation in the debt structure during
2003-2007, when the share of total debt was slightly larger than that of shareholder funds.
However, in 2011 the situation changed somewhat, with shareholder funds having a little
more weight than the total debt.
There is heterogeneity of nancing regarding the size and age of rms. We divide the
sample of rms into three equally numerous groups; in terms of size into small, medium,
7In the descriptive part, we compare the top and bottom thirds of size and age, while in the regressions,
we use continuous variables for each rm-specic indicator. Also we provide robustness tests where
categorized rm specic variables are used instead of continuous variables.
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and large, and in terms of age into young, medium, and old. This distinction reveals that
small and young rms tend to have more debt and fewer shareholder funds than large
and old companies (Figure 3.3, panels c and d). Firms in dierent size and age categories
also dier in terms of maturity of debt: smaller and older rms hold more short-term
debt than larger and younger rms, respectively. Larger rms have a higher share of
short-term bank loans and trade credit in their current liabilities,8 while age does not
play a crucial role for the maturity of short-term debt.
Figure 3.1: Change in the average debt structure and macro variables over time
Next, we describe the evolution of our debt ratios, which are depicted in Figure 3.1.
The data reveals that total TODEBT decreased continuously between the beginning and
end of the analyzed period, while the decline was more pronounced after 2006. This
decline occurred mainly because of a drop in other current liabilities and SHTRADE.
8Other current liabilities appear to be quite important for small rms. Unfortunately, the data set
does not yield more details about this item. Other current liabilities typically include taxes, payroll,
customer advances, rental liabilities.
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The variability of LDEBT and SHLOAN was smaller.
In the second graph, we see that the movements in market interest rates traced the
changes in monetary policy rates, except for the years aected by the nancial crisis, when
monetary policy had to be more aggressive to ease the monetary conditions adequately.
Since we use market rates in the regressions, we capture the part of the transmission
that occurs between money market and client rates, which - in normal times - is a good
representation of the transmission of monetary policy rates.
Table 3.2: Correlation coecients
The correlations between the debt ratios and other rm-specic indicators and the
interest rate are shown in Table 3.2. TODEBT is positively correlated with all other
debt ratios by construction. A positive correlation exists between SIZE and all the debt
ratios, though the correlation with long-term debt is weaker. We also observe a negative
correlation between AGE and TODEBT. AGE and SIZE are positively correlated, indi-
cating that the older a rm becomes, the more assets it tends to accumulate.9 PROFIT
does not have strong correlations with the other variables. COLLATERAL is positively
correlated with both short-term bank loans and long-term debt. The correlations between
the 3-month PRIBOR and the debt ratios are negligible.
9To test for multicollinearity among the variables we estimate the variance ination factor (VIF)
and the condition index (Table 3.6 in Appendix 3.A.2). Test results indicate the presence of some
multicollinearity, which is common in models that include interaction terms. Centering of multiplicative
variables solves this problem. The nal estimated VIFs are smaller than 10, and the condition index




In this section, we present our estimation results and ndings. The regression results are
summarized in Table 3.3, where each column corresponds to one of the four measures
of debt. We report the results of the regressions of the nancing ratios on market in-
terest rates while controlling for rm specicities, business cycles, and interaction terms
between interest rates and rm-specic indicators, which would capture the heterogene-
ity of responses to monetary policy. While the majority of the explanatory variables
have signicant eects on the debt ratios, we nd some heterogeneity in the reactions to
monetary policy.
Table 3.3: Estimation results
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First, we describe the main eect of monetary policy and rm specic variables on
debt ratios. Since we have interaction terms in the regression model, the coecients
in Table 3.3 cannot be interpreted directly. The pure eects of interest variables are
estimated by holding remaining variables at their mean (Table 3.4). According to the
interest rate channel, an increase in the price of external nancing makes debt nancing
more expensive, which should be reected in a decreasing share of debt. In our results, an
increase in the lagged short-term interbank rate (3 MONTH PRIBOR) reduces the overall
shares of total debt (TODEBT) and long-term debt (LDEBT). However we observe an
increase in short-term bank loans (SHLOAN) and a negligible increase in short-term
trade credit (SHTRADE). We explain this result by the following argument: loans of
short nature are less exible and are used to meet urgent needs of the rms. Therefore
these types of nancing do not instantaneously respond to changes in the price of external
debt. However rms are not willing to borrow long-term debt at an increased interest
rate.
The size and age of a rm are found to be important determinants of debt. For
example, our results indicate that larger rms tend to have higher debt ratios than smaller
rms, ceteris paribus. Large rms have more power, better contact and reputation.
Moreover, greater amounts of information are available for larger rms that are monitored
by more traders and professional analysts (Collins et al., 1987). Higher transparency eases
access of larger rms to the external sources of nancing.
In terms of age, older rms tend to have less total debt, trade credit, and long-term
debt, and more short-term bank debt than younger rms do. Presumably, rms, after
more years of establishment, use less external nancing, especially debts of a long-term
nature. However with more years of relations with commercial banks, they can easily
access short-term bank loans.
The use of debt is also determined by the rm's COLLATERAL, which is measured
as the ratio of tangible xed assets to total assets. Firms with more collateral tend to
have more total, short-term and long-term bank debt, but less trade credit. This would
be in line with the hypothesis that - because of better guarantees - this subset of rms
can easily access bank debt and therefore is not in need of trade credit.
PROFIT has a negative impact on all debt ratios, meaning that rms with higher
earnings use less external nancing. This result is reasonable, since more protable rms
may use more of their generated income - which tends to be less expensive - and hence
be less dependent on external nancing as compared to less protable rms.
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Finally, higher shares of total debt and short-term bank loans coincide with higher
GDP growth rates. This result would be in line with the hypothesis that more credit
is issued in good times because of better economic prospects and higher protability of
investment perceived by both banks and rms. However, according to the results for
the long-term bank debt this hypothesis does not hold since GDP growth rate has an
insignicant coecient for this debt ratio.
Table 3.4: Main eects
We have to note that according to our econometric model the eect of interest rate
cannot be studied independently. As we mentioned above, there are rm specic parame-
ters that inuence how interest rate aects the nancing decisions of the rms. To analyze
how rms respond to changes in interest rate depending on their characteristics, we focus
on the interaction terms between the interest rate and rm specic characteristics. The
marginal eects of PRIBOR_3M on debt ratios for dierent rm specic parameters are
summarized in Figure 3.2.
As we can see, smaller rms decrease and larger rms increase their external nancing
in response to monetary contraction. This eect is more pronounced for total debt and
weaker for other external debt measures. Small rms may be more informationally opaque
and therefore more likely to be sensitive to external debt price changes compared to large
rms. This argument is supported by Pospí²il and Schwarz (2014), who nd that small
and medium-sized Czech rms are sensitive to external debt, which is not the case for
larger companies. Observed diverse responses can be explained by the supply-side eects:
the interest rate is high when the economy is growing and there is excess demand for
credit. In this situation large companies are less nancially constrained and can access
bank credit more easily to nance their expansion. In contrast, small rms are more
nancially constrained and should decrease the share of external debt in nancing their
investments.
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Surprisingly, age works in the reverse direction: total debt and short-term trade credit
decreases for older rms and increases for younger rms if the interest rate is rising. On
average younger rms do not change the share of short-term bank loans, though older
rms increase their short-term bank borrowing in response to monetary contraction. We
also observe a decrease in long-term debt among both groups, hence this decrease is
stronger for older rms. One explanation could be the fact that older rms are relatively
mature and are not as in need of external nancing as younger rms.
Figure 3.2: The eect of 3 MONTH PRIBOR on dierent external nancing decisions
for dierent rm specic characteristics
The data also reveal that during a monetary tightening, more collateralized rms
reduce their total debt and long-term bank credit more than less collateralized ones
do. The eect of monetary contraction on short-term debt is trivial for less collateralized
rms. In contrast rms with more collateral decrease short-term trade credit and increase
short-term bank loans if the interest rate rises. More collateral means better backing of
debt and therefore higher credibility among banks. In other words, highly collateralized
rms, which have better access to short-term bank debt, may be more exible in shifting
from long-term to short-term debt during periods of expensive money.
Prot has a similar eect on monetary transmission to size: rms that generate
positive prot increase and those that operate with loss decrease their external nancing
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in response to a monetary tightening. The eect is stronger for total debt and weaker for
other external debt measures. The explanation for this nding could be similar to the
one provided for the size eect.
3.5.1 Robustness Checks
In this subsection we provide three robustness tests by using longer term interest rates
for monetary policy, by including the available data for the year 2012 and by categorizing
rm specic characteristics. The outcomes of the tests are provided in Appendix 3.A.3. In
general, our previous ndings are robust to these tests, although there are some interesting
dierences vis-à-vis our baseline model.
Three month interbank rates are more commonly used in the literature as a measure of
short-term interest rate, since these rates more accurately reect the monetary conditions.
However, in order to check the robustness of our results we re-estimate them by using
a longer term interest rate, the 1-year PRIBOR instead of the benchmark measure, the
3-month PRIBOR. The 1-year PRIBOR might better capture the pricing of dierent
nancing measures (e.g. short-term bank loans) of the rms. As we can see, the results
are qualitatively identical to our previous estimates (Table 3.7 and Figure 3.4 in Appendix
3.A.3).
In our benchmark regressions, we excluded the year 2012 due to missing data for
about half of the rms. We do have a signicant chunk of data for 2012 (about 22,000
observations, or 7% of the total), but we did not include it in our baseline estimation
because of concerns about sample selection bias. If we include the year 2012, the results
do not signicantly dier from those where it is excluded (Table 3.8 and Figure 3.5 in
Appendix 3.A.3).
Finally, instead of continuous variables we use dummy variables to capture the eects
of rm specic variables. Sometimes this method is used to obtain more straightforward
interpretations for the estimation results. We categorize the rm-specic variables into
three groups: the top 33 percent, the middle 33 percent, and the top 33 percent. The
distribution of each rm-specic variable (Figure 3.7) and the categorization criteria, i.e.,
the cutpoints between groups (Table 3.10) are given in Appendix 3.A.4. The regression
results with dummy variables are summarized in Table 3.9 and in Figure 3.6 in Appendix
3.A.3.
If we compare Figure 3.2 with Figure 3.6 we can see that the relative trends for
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dierent rm specic characteristics are identical. However we observe dierences in the
relative eects. For instance, when we use dummies, large rms also decrease their long-
term debt in response to monetary tightening, though this decrease is smaller compared
to small rms. Everything else is almost identical to the case where a continuous size
variable is used. In terms of age, now both age categories increase their total debt and
short-term trade credit ratios when interest rate rises. However this increase is smaller for
old rms. Firms with low collateral increase and those with high collateral decrease total
debt ratio if the cost of borrowing is rising. The eect of prot on monetary transmission
is not changed substantially when prot dummies are used.
3.6 Conclusion
In this study we look for evidence of balance sheet, bank lending, and relationship chan-
nels of monetary policy transmission in the Czech Republic. We concentrate on the
heterogeneous response of rms' nancing decisions to monetary shocks depending on
their size, age, collateral, and prot. We use the Amadeus rm-level database from Bu-
reau van Dijk and our sample contains nancial and other yearly data for about 57,000
rms over the 2003-2011 period.
The data show that - for Czech rms - the rms' own capital makes up on average
about one half of total liabilities and that nancial loans account for about 20 percent
of liabilities.10 The share of shareholder funds in total liabilities increased from 48.1% to
52.3% during 2003-2011. About 16-18 percent of the total liabilities of Czech rms are
in the form of trade credit.
Our regression results indicate that a monetary contraction leads to a reduction in the
shares of total debt and long-term debt and an increase in the shares of short-term bank
loans and trade credit. We also conrm that the size, age, collateral, and protability
of a rm are important determinants of debt. For example, larger rms tend to have
higher debt ratios than smaller rms, ceteris paribus. In terms of age, older rms tend
to have less total debt, trade credit, and long-term debt, and more short-term bank debt
than younger rms do. Firms with more collateral tend to have more total, short-term
and long-term bank debt, but less trade credit. The protability of a rm has a negative
impact on all debt ratios, meaning that rms with higher earnings use less external
10This is conrmed by aggregate information from the Quarterly Financial Accounts, a statistical sys-
tem produced by the Czech National Bank which records the nancial relationships within the economy.
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nancing.
Our main nding is that smaller and less protable rms are aected more by a
monetary contraction compared to larger and more protable rms. Specically, smaller
and less protable rms reduce their external nancing, while larger and more protable
rms increase their external nancing during periods of tight monetary policy. The data
also show that higher interest rates lead to an increase of total debt among young rms
and a decrease among old rms. We also nd that more collateralized rms increase their
short-term bank credit and reduce short-term trade credit when the interest rate rises.
Total debt and long-term debt decreases for all rms, while this decrease is higher for
more collateralized rms.
The evidence of the heterogeneity of reactions to interest rate changes, depending
on rm's size, age, and balance sheet positions, indicates the presence of informational
frictions in the markets for rm nancing in the Czech Republic. The heterogeneous
response of rms with dierent balance sheet positions points to the existence of a balance
sheet channel in the Czech Republic. The varying response of small rms observed, which
are more dependent on external nancing, versus large rms, which are less dependent
on external nancing, may be an indirect indicator of the existence of a bank lending
channel, with the caveat that we do not control for the supply of loans. In general all
these ndings provide some evidence of broad credit channels in the Czech Republic.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Structure of Liabilities
Table 3.5: T-test of dierences between means of dierent debt ratios for dierent


























3.A.2 Testing for Multicollinearity
Table 3.6: Collinearity diagnostics
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3.A.3 Robustness Tests
Table 3.7: Estimation results: with 1 YEAR PRIBOR
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Figure 3.4: The eect of 1 YEAR PRIBOR on dierent external nancing decisions
for dierent rm specic characteristics
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Table 3.8: Estimation results: with year 2012
102
Figure 3.5: The eect of 3 MONTH PRIBOR on dierent external nancing decisions
for dierent rm specic characteristics: with year 2012
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Table 3.9: Estimation results: with categorization
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Figure 3.6: The eect of 3 MONTH PRIBOR on dierent external nancing decisions
for dierent rm specic characteristics: with categorization
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3.A.4 Categorization Criteria for Firm-specic Variables
Figure 3.7: Distribution of rm specic variables
Table 3.10: Categorization criteria and summary statistics for dierent groups
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